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ABSTRACT—The United States has included some form of income tax on
corporations at least since the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment one
hundred years ago. Notwithstanding this long lineage, however,
surprisingly little is known about who ultimately ends up bearing the cost
of the tax, or whether it even matters. Perhaps in simpler economic times
such as 1913, or 1932, or even 1980, this might have been acceptable. But
as the world confronts vastly different economic conditions than the ones
faced in the past, finding new ways to understand and implement the
corporate tax for the next one hundred years will become crucial to its
survival. This Article will introduce one such way, by taking into account
how macroeconomic conditions, such as high unemployment, impact who
bears the cost of the corporate income tax. This insight can fundamentally
alter the landscape of the existing corporate tax policy debate, from
whether to use corporate taxes to increase the progressivity of the income
tax, to lowering the corporate tax rate to stimulate the economy, to
abolishing the corporate tax altogether. By explicitly incorporating both
macro- and microeconomic considerations into fiscal policy, policymakers
can transform the corporate income tax from a blunt and uncertain fiscal
tool into a precise instrument robust enough to survive the next one
hundred years.
This Article will consider one specific example—proposing a
dynamic, self-adjusting corporate tax rate, or DST for short. The DST takes
into account the fact that specific macroeconomic conditions, such as high
unemployment, can create incentives for employers to shift the cost of the
corporate tax onto labor through lower wages, increased layoffs, or
otherwise. The DST offsets this by charging employers (through higher
marginal tax rates) when they do shift the cost of the corporate tax onto
labor while, at the same time, rewarding employers (through lower
marginal tax rates) when they make instead new investments in labor. In
this manner, the DST could help reduce existing tax-induced distortions to
behavior and address high unemployment at the same time.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has included some form of income tax on
corporations at least since the enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment one
hundred years ago.1 Notwithstanding its long lineage, however, little is
known about how the corporate income tax actually works or who ends up
paying for it. Until recently, this inability to comprehend precisely who
bears the cost of the corporate income tax has been accepted as a sort of
necessary evil. Perhaps in simpler economic times, such as 1913, 1932, or
even 1980,2 tax policy could tolerate this lack of understanding without
causing any undue harm. But in this anniversary year of the modern income
tax, with a large, complex, and multinational economy characterized by
very low interest rates, persistently high unemployment, highly mobile
1

See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-in Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J.
889, 915–17 (2006). Forms of a corporate income tax were in place prior to the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment and the enactment of the modern income tax in 1913 as well. See 1 BORIS I.
BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE WITH THE COLLABORATION OF GERSHAM GOLDSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 1.01 (Thomson Reuters/WG&L 7th ed. 2013)
(1959).
2
See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Op-Ed., Reaganism After Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at A17
(“They slavishly adhere to the economic program that Reagan developed to meet the challenges of the
late 1970s and early 1980s, ignoring the fact that he largely overcame those challenges, and now we
have new ones.”).
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multinational corporations, sophisticated financial markets, and near-zero
inflation, it is time to rethink what a corporate tax can and should look like
for the next one hundred years.
A debate has emerged over using tax policy, and particularly corporate
tax policy, to address the ills of the modern economy. One side argues that
taxes must be cut to stimulate investment and economic growth, while the
other argues that tax cuts would be nothing more than a giveaway to the
rich.3 Both sides see the issue as all-or-nothing. In this respect, at least, both
sides are wrong. There is no reason the debate need be limited simply to
raising or lowering the tax rate, pitting growth against employment. Rather,
modern conceptions of macroeconomic theory can be incorporated into the
analysis to create a new fiscal policy—one that is uniquely suited for the
challenges of the new economy and fosters both economic growth and
employment.
The key to doing so in the corporate income tax context is to focus on
what economists call the “incidence” of the tax (or, put more simply, who
ultimately pays the cost of the tax). Essentially, when a corporation pays a
tax, at least one of the following groups must lose: shareholders in the form
of lower profits, workers in the form of lower wages, or consumers in the
form of higher prices.4 Most economists traditionally believed that
shareholders bore the cost of the corporate tax in the form of lower profits.5
Recently, however, economists have begun to question this conclusion,
finding that, in the modern economy, workers often bear a significant
portion of the tax in the form of lower wages, lower employment, or both.6
This Article, relying on these developments in the theoretical and empirical
economics literature, will work under the assumption that, under the unique
conditions of the modern economy, increasing amounts of the corporate
income tax are often borne by labor rather than capital.7
3

See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 18, 2012, at A12.
4
In other words, “[t]he most basic lesson about corporate taxes is this: A corporation is not really a
taxpayer at all. It is more like a tax collector. The ultimate payers of the corporate tax are those
individuals who have some stake in the company on which the tax is levied. . . . The corporate tax leads
to lower returns on capital, lower wages or higher prices . . . .” N. Gregory Mankiw, The Problem with
the Corporate Tax, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/business/01
view.html?_r=0.
5
See Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215
(1962).
6
See generally Bruce Bartlett, Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG
(Feb. 19, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/who-pays-the-corporateincome-tax (summarizing four articles on corporate tax incidence published in the March 2013 issue of
the National Tax Journal); see also infra notes 22–30 and accompanying text.
7
Although only corporate shareholders own stock in entities that pay the corporate income tax, all
capital over time effectively bears whatever share of the corporate income tax is borne by shareholders
through operations of the market. See JULIE-ANNE CRONIN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: REVISED U.S. TREASURY
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Such a conclusion could radically alter the landscape of the modern
corporate tax debate. Almost all proposals to reform the corporate income
tax, from those supporting a raise in the corporate income tax (to increase
progressivity of the tax system) to those supporting the elimination of the
corporate income tax altogether, make some assumption about who is in
fact bearing the incidence of the tax. Regardless of one’s goals, knowing
more about the incidence of the corporate income tax and the impact of
macroeconomic conditions on incidence will increase one’s ability to meet
these goals through the design and structure of the corporate income tax.
To this end, why not envision a corporate tax that is both pro-growth
and pro-employment at the same time, while proving self-financing in the
long run? This need not be the stuff of science fiction. Building a progrowth, pro-employment, self-financing corporate income tax may be
possible, but it will require fundamentally rethinking how the corporate tax
actually works and what it should be intended to accomplish. To do so will
require deconstructing a number of well-established and generally accepted
propositions about the operation of the corporate income tax and
recombining them, for the first time, to take into account the unique
conditions of the modern economy.
This Article will provide one example of how to do so, by proposing
the repeal of the current fixed corporate income tax rate and replacing it
with a new dynamic, self-adjusting tax, or DST for short. To counteract an
employer’s incentive to shift incidence onto labor due to macroeconomic
conditions, the DST ties the corporate tax rate directly to the employment
decisions of corporate employers—as employment goes up, taxes go down,
and vice versa.
The DST could offer a number of benefits. The first, and primary,
benefit would be a traditional microeconomic one. Assuming labor bears an
inefficiently high percentage of the corporate tax during periods of high
unemployment as compared to periods of more typical levels of
unemployment, shifting the burden back to capital should result in
efficiency gains. The DST accomplishes this by charging employers for
attempting to shift the incidence of the tax onto labor during periods of
high unemployment.
Unlike traditional efficiency-driven tax policy proposals, however, the
DST could also have a positive macroeconomic feedback effect in addition
to its microeconomic benefits. If labor bears an increasing share of the
incidence of the corporate tax during periods of high unemployment,
METHODOLOGY 2 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/
OTA-T2012-05-Distributing-the-Corporate-Income-Tax-Methodology-May-2012.pdf (“As capital
flows take place, the corporate tax burden is shifted to non-corporate capital over time through
reductions in the return to non-corporate capital until after tax returns in both sectors are the same. As
such, the tax burden initially falls on current owners of corporate capital and then on future investors of
corporate and non-corporate capital.”).
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cutting corporate taxes should result in more jobs, higher wages, or both.
But rather than merely hoping this occurs,8 the DST conditions the
corporate tax cut on actually increasing payroll, rather than hoarding cash
or paying the savings out as a dividend. Consequently, at least some of the
cash savings from the tax cut would go to the benefit of labor, in the form
of higher wages or reduced layoffs, while the remainder would be available
to the corporation to be invested in productive assets.
But that is not the end of the story, since any corporate tax cut would
also need to be paid for.9 As an initial matter, the combination of economic
growth and increased employment resulting from the DST has the ability to
increase revenue itself, at least to some extent. But the DST also has its
own automatic, built-in revenue feature10: raising tax rates on firms that
reduce payroll. This has two benefits. First, to avoid this tax increase,
corporations would have an incentive to look elsewhere, other than
reducing labor costs, to cut costs in the face of a recession. Second, the
government would raise revenue as wages decreased or unemployment
increased, or both, since the companies that did reduce payroll would incur
higher tax rates. By both creating incentives to reduce layoffs or wage cuts
and increasing revenue, the proposal could essentially pay for itself over
the long run, at least based on relatively conservative assumptions.
Tying together the business cycle, the corporate income tax, and the
firm’s employment decisions in this manner could permit the corporate tax
to embody both pro-growth and pro-employment fiscal policies at the same
time. Rather than merely raising or lowering total taxes in response to
recessions, the proposal would serve to offset the implicit shift of the
incidence of the corporate tax away from capital and onto labor during
periods of high unemployment, while at the same time substantially cutting
taxes for corporations that increase employment. In this manner, the tax
law would—for the first time—be unified toward pro-growth and proemployment policies, while remaining largely self-financing over the longterm.
Combining economic theory and legal theory in this manner can
provide the means to overcome the seemingly intractable, and definitely
unhelpful, political and policy stalemate facing the country. By rejecting
the binary of demand-side versus supply-side economic theory—
exemplified in the “tax cuts for the rich” versus “fairness for the middle
8

See Mankiw, supra note 4; cf. NILS AUS DEM MOORE & TANJA KASTEN, DO WAGES RISE WHEN
CORPORATE TAX RATES FALL? DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSES OF THE GERMAN BUSINESS
TAX REFORM 2000 (2009), http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/MooreKasten2009.pdf (empirically
analyzing whether wages rise when corporate tax rates fall).
9
One proposal has been to increase the gasoline tax to offset a corporate tax rate cut. See Mankiw,
supra note 4 (“[A] gas-tax increase of about 40 cents a gallon could fund a corporate rate cut, fostering
economic growth and reducing a variety of driving-related problems.”).
10
See id. (“Some economists think that these effects are strong enough to make a corporate rate cut
self-financing.”).
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class” debate—both sides could rightfully claim victory for their preferred
tax policy. Of course, no tax law can prevent or mitigate pure demagoguery
or hyperbolic hysteria over tax policy, but this new approach has the
potential to challenge, weaken, or even topple, the existing policy
rationales underlying the intransigence of the modern debate.
Part I of this Article will summarize and discuss the literature on
corporate tax incidence and explain how under conditions of high
unemployment, low inflation, and near-zero interest rates, the corporate tax
can be borne significantly by workers. Part II.A will then introduce
macroeconomic theory into the analysis, discussing how current
macroeconomic conditions significantly change the way to think about the
corporate tax itself. In response, Part II.B introduces the pro-growth, proemployment, self-financing DST mechanism as a solution to the current
problem. Part II.C will go on to explain how, taking the incidence analysis
as a given, the DST can better achieve the fiscal policy goals of the tax
system. Part III will then discuss some theoretical and administrative
difficulties in implementing the proposal. Lastly, Part IV will review some
of the political and rhetorical hurdles facing the use of tax law as fiscal
policy, and discuss how the analytic approach of this Article, if not the
DST itself, can help overcome these hurdles.
THE INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX AND
MACROECONOMICS: HISTORY AND LESSONS
Notwithstanding over one hundred years of experience, surprisingly
little is known about how the corporate income tax actually works or who
ends up paying it. The question of who ultimately bears the cost of the
corporate income tax is generally referred to as the problem of the
“incidence” of the corporate income tax.11 The root cause behind the
incidence problem is pretty straightforward: corporations are not human
beings. Rather, corporations are creatures of law, allocations of power and
responsibility among people to permit the efficient pooling of capital by
separating ownership of capital from the management of it.12
Then what does it mean for a corporation to “pay” taxes? It simply
means that the corporation transfers wealth to the government instead of to
one of its constituencies—shareholders, employees, suppliers, or
consumers.13 Since income taxes are paid out of profits, and shareholders
are generally entitled to the profits of a corporation, it would appear at first
that the incidence of the tax must be borne by the shareholders. However,
this may not necessarily be correct, as there are other constituencies that
I.

11

See Harberger, supra note 5, at 215.
This is true regardless which theory of corporate personhood is applied. See, e.g., David Millon,
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 183 (2004); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
13
See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX 58–59 (2009).
12
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could effectively bear the incidence of the corporate tax as well.14 For
example, a corporation could raise the price of its goods or services to
account for the income tax thereby ensuring after-tax profits remain the
same. In such a case, consumers would effectively bear the incidence of the
corporate income tax through higher prices.15 Alternatively, a corporation
could lower employee salaries to maintain the same after-tax profits, in
which case labor would bear the incidence of the corporate tax. So which
group really bears the brunt of the incidence—capital, labor, or
consumers?16 The well-established answer in the literature is . . . nobody
knows.17 Or, more precisely, that nobody can ever really know.18 Rather,
the answer to “who bears the cost of the corporate income tax?” depends on
one’s theory about how corporations and the economy interact, and which
constituencies have no other choice but to bear the incidence. The next
section summarizes some of these theories.
A. A Brief Background on Incidence Theory
Harberger first comprehensively analyzed the incidence of the
corporate tax over fifty years ago.19 Harberger assumed two industries—a
taxed one and an untaxed one—and the presence of efficient markets.
Under these assumptions, the incidence of the tax on the taxed sector
depended on the relative inputs into each industry. In other words, in laborintensive industries labor would bear more of the tax and in capitalintensive industries capital would bear more of the tax. Crucially, however,
Harberger assumed full employment in this model, a standard assumption.20
This was important because it meant that labor would leave the taxed
industry and move to the untaxed industry as the tax cost increased. Since
there could be no involuntary unemployment, under basic supply and
demand theory the increased supply of labor in the untaxed industry would
result in lower labor costs, which would also then attract capital, until a
14

See id. at 63.
Although this is possible for a particular consumer, consumers as a whole are generally not
considered to bear the incidence of the corporate tax since it would “wash” out over multiple
corporations. See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 63; Harberger, supra note 5, at 217–20.
16
This analysis assumes end-product producers only. There is another possibility, however, that
intermediate suppliers would bear the corporate income tax through lower prices. Assuming some fixed
costs of production and competition, however, there is a limit to the ability to do so. See, e.g., Kul B.
Bhatia, Intermediate Goods and the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 16 J. PUB. ECON. 93
(1981).
17
See William A. Klein, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax: A Lawyer’s View of a
Problem in Economics, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 576, 601 (“[T]he only proper answer to the question ‘Is the
corporation income tax shifted?’ must be, ‘Maybe so, maybe not—I just don’t know.’”).
18
See Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, in 20 TAX
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (James M. Poterba ed., 2006); Bartlett, supra note 6.
19
See Harberger, supra note 5.
20
Id. at 216.
15
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new equilibrium was reached. Under the Harberger model, under most
standard assumptions, capital would generally bear most—if not all—of the
incidence of the corporate tax.
Subsequent work introduced the impact of other factors.21 For
example, Atkinson and Stiglitz introduced the impact of unemployment; in
other words, they relaxed the standard assumption used by Harberger that
the price of labor would always adjust such that there would never be
unemployment in the market.22 This proved rather difficult as there was
(and is) no single accepted theory for the presence of unemployment in an
economy. Importantly, the basis for assuming why there is unemployment
in the market impacts how it affects the incidence analysis.23 Atkinson and
Stiglitz introduced an assumption of nonmarket-clearing unemployment by
tying wages to sticky prices; in other words they assumed that for some
reason the price of labor could not change immediately in the face of
unemployment. This could occur, for example, if there were minimum
wage laws, union contracts, or other limits on the ability to reduce wages.
As a result, in contrast to what Harberger assumed, wages would not drop
in the face of excess supply of labor, and there would no longer be full
employment in the model.
Under that set of assumptions, unsurprisingly, the incidence analysis
changed significantly from Harberger’s analysis. Atkinson and Stiglitz
found three effects: (1) a direct effect on labor depending on the relative
elasticity of substitution between the taxed and untaxed sector, (2) an
indirect “demand” effect where the impact on labor depended on the impact
on prices and the labor intensity of the taxed sector, and (3) an effect on
labor depending on the relative elasticity of the price of labor in the
market.24 The conclusion they drew was that “[w]here the individual is
unable to sell all the labour he wishes, an expansion of employment
contributes ceteris paribus to an increase in welfare.”25 Intuitively this
makes sense; if something in the economy creates involuntary
unemployment, there will be more workers looking for work than there will
be jobs. In such a case, workers should be willing to work for less, meaning
21

See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS
222–26 (1980); Jennifer C. Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: Review of General Equilibrium
Estimates and Analysis (Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper No. 2010-03, 2010), https://www.cbo.
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11519/05-2010-working_paper-corp_tax_incidencereview_of_gen_eq_estimates.pdf.
22
See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 222.
23
See, e.g., Leon Bettendorf et al., Corporate Tax Policy and Unemployment in Europe: An
Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, 32 WORLD ECON. 1319, 1319 (2009) (“There is only little
research, however, on the labour market implications of corporate taxation, and virtually no papers on
corporate taxes and unemployment. . . . Previous studies that have analysed the relationship between
corporate taxes and employment have typically assumed a perfect labour market.”).
24
See ATKINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 21, at 225.
25
Id.
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employers can more easily shift the incidence of the corporate tax onto
workers than in a world absent unemployment.
Importantly, regardless of the methodology used, recent work using a
number of different theories of involuntary unemployment have found
labor bearing a significantly higher share of the incidence of the corporate
tax than under the Harberger model. For example, Miyagiwa26 looked at the
effects of sectoral unemployment, in which certain sectors of the economy
cannot lower wages while others can (for example, when there is a
unionized and nonunionized sector of the economy).27 Agell and Lundborg
looked at involuntary unemployment as a result of fair wages, meaning
employees care not only about total wages, but also about the ratio of
wages to returns on capital.28 Parai and Choudhary analyzed incidence
where labor was not perfectly mobile.29 Rapanos considered the question
under the impact of efficiency wages, comparing not only the dollar cost of
wages but also the impact of those wages on the effort of labor.30
Regardless of the theory, all of the above studies concluded that labor bears
more of the incidence of the corporate income tax in the presence of
unemployment than under the Harberger model.
What emerges from this line of literature is a distinct lack of consensus
on how macroeconomic conditions impact the incidence analysis,31 since
26

Kaz Miyagiwa, Corporate Income Tax Incidence in the Presence of Sector-Specific
Unemployment, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 103 (1988).
27
Others have looked at similar questions as well. See, e.g., Leonard F.S. Wang, Sector-Specific
Unemployment and Corporate Income Tax Incidence: A Geometric Exposition, 37 AM. ECONOMIST 64
(1993).
28
Jonas Agell & Per Lundborg, Fair Wages, Involuntary Unemployment and Tax Policies in the
Simple General Equilibrium Model, 47 J. PUB. ECON. 299 (1992).
29
Amar K. Parai & Munir A.S. Choudhary, Imperfect Labor Mobility and Corporate Tax
Incidence, 6 INT’L ECON. J. 75 (1992). If labor were not perfectly mobile, workers who lost jobs in one
city would not be able to take jobs in another, leading to some unemployment.
30
Vassilis T. Rapanos, Tax Incidence in a Model with Efficiency Wages and Unemployment,
20 INT’L ECON. J. 477 (2006). Efficiency wage theory would explain involuntary unemployment by
attributing two motivating factors to the labor wage rate: (1) supply and demand for labor and (2) the
effect of the wage rate on the effort of employees. Id. at 479. Thus, it could be rational for an employer
to pay a higher wage than absolutely necessary if that higher wage resulted in higher effort by workers,
making the per-dollar return on labor higher. If this occurs, the labor wage rate is set above the marketclearing rate, resulting in involuntary unemployment. Assuming this is true, higher levels of
unemployment would serve to reduce the pure labor wage rate, meaning employers could extract even
greater effort out of labor at the existing efficiency wage rate.
31
See Uwe E. Reinhardt, Who Ultimately Pays the Corporate Income Tax?, N.Y. TIMES
ECONOMIX BLOG (July 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/23/whoultimately-pays-the-corporate-income-tax/?_r=0 (“General-equilibrium models accommodating this
wider view of the economy and the longer run go much beyond the compass of a freshman course and
show that who actually pays the corporate income tax—the owners of capital or labor—is driven by a
number of factors in complicated ways that elude simple intuition.”); see also Peter Mieszkowski, Tax
Incidence Theory: The Effects of Taxes on the Distribution of Income, 7 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1103,
1116–17 (1969) (criticizing previous studies for omitting significant changes in unemployment over
their sample time periods).
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one’s results depend on how one explains the presence of macroeconomic
conditions, such as high unemployment, in the first place.32 But what does
emerge is that almost any theory of unemployment, whether it be efficiency
wages, lack of labor mobility, unions, or otherwise, leads to labor bearing a
larger portion of the incidence of the corporate income tax than under the
Harberger model. Thus, if one takes as a given the presence of high,
persistent unemployment, low inflation, and near-zero interest rates, such
as in the current economy, it is possible to state that the relative elasticity of
labor during periods of high unemployment is lower than the relative
elasticity of labor during periods of full employment. Under Atkinson–
Stiglitz, one effect of this change in relative elasticity of labor would be an
increase of the incidence of the tax on labor. Under other approaches, such
as Agell and Lundborg or Paraia and Choudharya or Rapanos, this would
almost certainly be the effect.
In other words, at some point members of the labor force could
become locked into their jobs, meaning labor becomes near inelastic. At
such a point, it would be anticipated that capital could much more easily
demand increased effort, lower wages, or both, even during times of record
profits.33 The same could be thought of in terms of the incidence of the
tax.34
One theory of the incidence of the corporate income tax that adopts a
similar approach is sometimes referred to as the “wage bargaining”
model.35 Under the wage bargaining model, employers take into account
the cost of the tax and then attempt to allocate it among the relative
constituencies. As would be expected, who bears the incidence of the tax
depends on the relative elasticities of the constituencies. If labor has high
bargaining power, capital will bear more of the incidence.36 If consumers
highly demand the product, the corporation can raise prices and consumers
will bear more of the incidence.

32

See, e.g., CRONIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–6 (discussing assumptions in previous incidence
studies). For example, neoclassical economics assumes that involuntary unemployment cannot exist,
Keynesian economics takes it as a given, while New Classical and New Keynesian try to rationalize
these positions. See, e.g., Paul Wojick & Mark Pernecky, The Impossibility of Involuntary
Unemployment in New Keynesian Efficiency Wage Models, 20 E. ECON. J. 291 (1994).
33
There is some indication that this may be the case. See Neil Irwin, Who Will Get the Spoils of an
Improving Economy: Shareholders or Workers?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 9, 2013, 5:06 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/09/who-will-get-the-spoils-of-animproving-economy-shareholders-or-workers.
34
See SHAVIRO, supra note 13, at 59–60 (describing the elasticity theory of tax incidence).
35
For a recent example, see Wiji Arulampalam et al., The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income
Tax on Wages (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper No. 5293, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1704266.
36
See R. Alison Felix & James R. Hines, Jr., Corporate Taxes and Union Wages in the United
States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15263, 2009), available at http://www.nb
er.org/papers/w15263.
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Interestingly, although not the dominant theory under the Harberger
line of incidence literature, this wage bargaining model of tax incidence has
begun to attract significant empirical support. For example, one recent
empirical study found that labor could bear up to 75% of the incidence of
the corporate tax,37 while another study found that labor could bear up to
60% of the tax in the face of imperfect competition and capital mobility,38
and a working paper from the Congressional Budget Office estimated the
amount to be upwards of 70%.39 Crucially, all of these studies focus on the
relative elasticity of labor as compared to capital. To the extent a high
inelasticity of labor supply is assumed, for example due to unusually high
and persistent unemployment, a corollary assumption would be that labor
would bear a disproportionate amount of the incidence of the corporate tax,
at least as compared to the situation of full employment.40
B. Conceptualizing Incidence in the Modern Economy: An Example
To illustrate, imagine a company—assume it is called General
Automotive (GA)—which manufactures and sells cars. In a typical year
GA makes 1000 cars, which sell for $20,000 each, generating $20 million
in gross revenue per year. The raw materials for the cars cost $10 million,
which remains relatively fixed year to year, and GA employs 100 workers
who earn $50,000 per year, for a total labor cost of $5 million. Taken
together, in a typical year GA earns a profit of $5 million. Then, out of the
blue, the economy goes into a deep recession, and people stop buying as
many cars. GA’s sales drop from 1000 cars per year to 800 cars per year,
total revenue drops from $20 million to $16 million, and profits drop from
$5 million to $1 million.
37

Arulampalam et al., supra note 35, at 5 (citing Mihir A. Desai et al., Labor and Capital Shares of
the Corporate Tax Burden: International Evidence (Dec. 2007) (presented at the International Tax
Policy Forum and Urban–Brookings Tax Policy Center 2007 conference), available at http://www.aea
web.org/aea/2011conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=326). But see Kimberly A. Clausing, In
Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. 433 (2012) (criticizing some of these studies).
38
See Li Liu & Rosanne Altshuler, Measuring the Burden of the Corporate Income Tax Under
Imperfect Competition 3 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 11/05, 2011),
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/
Series_11/WP1105.pdf.
39
See William C. Randolph, International Burdens of the Corporate Income Tax 44 (Cong. Budget
Office, Working Paper No. 2006-09, 2006), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/75
xx/doc7503/2006-09.pdf; see also Robert Carroll, Corporate Taxes and Wages: Evidence from the 50
States 3 (Tax Found., Working Paper No. 8, 2009), http://www.taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.
org/files/docs/wp8.pdf (“[F]or every one dollar increase in state and local corporate tax revenues, wages
can be expected to fall by roughly 2.5 dollars.”).
40
See, e.g., JIM NUNNS, URBAN INST. & URBAN–BROOKINGS TAX POLICY CTR., HOW TPC
DISTRIBUTES THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX (2012), http://taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412651Tax-Model-Corporate-Tax-Incidence.pdf. For a good overview of empirical evidence on labor’s share
of corporate tax incidence, see Matthew H. Jensen & Aparna Mathur, Corporate Tax Burden on Labor:
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 131 TAX NOTES 1083 (2011).
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Assuming raw materials costs are fixed, and dropping the price might
sell more cars but would not raise total profits, the only available avenue to
increase profit would be to decrease labor cost. Assume GA does so,
announcing an across-the-board salary reduction of 20%, reducing its labor
cost to $4 million and thereby immediately doubling its profits from
$1 million to $2 million—not as good as in a typical year but much better
than the year before.41 But why would labor put up with this, and why
would a competitor not hire away the disgruntled workers? In periods of
deep unemployment, labor has little choice; there are no other jobs as
competitors are not hiring. Consequently, in effect, GA managed to shift
the bulk of the costs of reduced sales due to the recession onto labor and
away from capital, precisely because in a recession labor has nowhere else
to go.
Just like the cost of reduced sales during a recession, a corporation can
allocate the cost of an income tax among capital, labor, and consumers as
well. In a growing economy workers or consumers may have several
choices. Thus, if a corporation tries to allocate the tax on workers (through
lower wages, for example) workers will simply leave for a different job.
This is effectively the Harberger result. In a deep recession, however,
workers no longer have the option to leave, or at least to a much lesser
extent, because of high unemployment. Meanwhile, a corporation, such as
GA, presumably cannot raise prices in a recession because consumers have
less money than when the economy was robust. Therefore, just like GA
shifted a substantial amount of the cost from lower sales onto labor, GA
would also have an incentive to shift its tax burden onto labor during
periods of high unemployment.42 This is effectively the Atkinson and
Stiglitz result.
II. INTEGRATING MACROECONOMICS AND THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX:
THEORY AND EXTENSIONS
A. A Brief Background on the Role of Fiscal Policy in
Macroeconomic Theory
As demonstrated in the example above, it is possible for
macroeconomic conditions to distort microeconomic decisionmaking. It
follows, therefore, that removing existing implicit tax-induced distortions
can theoretically serve both to increase the overall efficiency of corporate
hiring decisions from a microeconomic standpoint and, at the same time,

41

For a discussion of the relative burden of a recession on labor and capital, see ANDREW SUM ET

AL., CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUDIES, NE. UNIV., THE “JOBLESS AND WAGELESS” RECOVERY FROM THE

GREAT RECESSION OF 2007–2009: THE MAGNITUDE AND SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH
2011 I AND THEIR IMPACTS ON WORKERS, PROFITS, AND STOCK VALUES (2011).
42
See Arulampalam et al., supra note 35, at 28–29.
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supplement macroeconomic pro-employment policies.43 Would it not be
simpler just to wait until there is a significant increase in unemployment
and then implement a targeted tax break to stimulate the economy, rather
than make permanent changes to the corporate income tax? The answer, as
discussed below, lies in the development of modern macroeconomic
theory, or more specifically, on a deep lack of consensus among modern
economists on the workings of macroeconomic theory.
As discussed above, neoclassical economics assumes an economy with
no involuntary unemployment.44 The puzzle, therefore, faced by
neoclassical economics, and continued to be faced to this day, has been to
explain why there in fact was or is unemployment in the economy.45 John
Maynard Keynes was the first modern economist to attempt to understand
this by addressing the entirety of the economy in one theory.46 Keynes
posited, very generally, that unemployment resulted from a lack of demand
in the economy and that the solution to unemployment was therefore
government support for increased demand.47
Keynes’s theory was ultimately formalized through the “IS-LM” curve
model.48 Based on the IS-LM model, traditional Keynesian macroeconomic
theory holds that as demand drops during recessionary periods, government
spending can offset this reduction in demand, either by directly purchasing
goods and services or by putting money in the pockets of people who will
use it to consume, and thus reduce unemployment.49
As the economy emerged from World War II, economists began to
question the Keynesian model.50 For example, one criticism of the
43

See Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for
Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 88–89 (2012).
44
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
45
See Michael W.L. Elsby & Matthew D. Shapiro, Why Does Trend Growth Affect Equilibrium
Employment? A New Explanation of an Old Puzzle, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1378, 1378 (2012)
(“Explaining the variation in rates of employment over time has been a central question for labor and
macroeconomics and for public policy for several decades.”).
46
See ROGER E. BACKHOUSE, INTERPRETING MACROECONOMICS: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY
OF MACROECONOMIC THOUGHT 7 (1995) (citing JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936)).
47
The classic IS-LM model was developed by Hicks in 1937. See id. at 120; Michel De Vroey,
Getting Rid of Keynes? A Survey of the History of Macroeconomics from Keynes to Lucas and Beyond
2–5 (Nat’l Bank of Belg., Working Paper No. 187, 2010), http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/wp
187En.pdf.
48
See De Vroey, supra note 47, at 4 (citing Franco Modigliani, Liquidity Preference and the
Theory of Interest and Money, 12 ECONOMETRICA 45 (1944)). The IS-LM model has received increased
attention and support from some economists in recent years. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Destructive
Creativity, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/
destructive-creativity-2.
49
See Paul Krugman, IS-LMentary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011, 3:14 PM), http://krugman.blogs.ny
times.com/2011/10/09/is-lmentary.
50
See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 498–500 (6th ed. 2012).
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Keynesian model was that it called for increased government spending to
reduce unemployment, but most economic theory supported the idea that
debt-financed government spending would lead to increased inflation and
thus could increase unemployment.51
In response, by the 1960s critics began asserting that stable monetary
policy—the tool used to control inflation—should be the single tool used to
impact employment, meaning that fiscal policy was mostly irrelevant (or
even worse, harmful) to macroeconomic growth or stability.52 This was the
primary insight of the “monetarist” school of economics, perhaps
represented most famously by Milton Friedman.53
Another criticism of the Keynesian model was that it relied on the
concept of a multiplier effect where every dollar of demand stimulus
generated more than one dollar of growth.54 The intuition behind the
multiplier effect is that if the government provides one dollar in
unemployment insurance, the recipient spends it at a store, which then can
hire employees; these employees, in turn, can then consume at a different
store, which can then hire even more employees, etc. In other words, a
dollar of demand stimulus is worth a lot more than a dollar because it is
used multiple times in the economy. Thus, the government was justified in
borrowing one dollar to spend on one dollar of demand stimulus because it
generated more than one dollar of growth.
If the multiplier effect were not true, however, every dollar borrowed
by the government and spent by recipients would have the exact same
impact on the economy as a whole as if the government had simply left the
dollar in the economy to begin with—that is, a dollar is a dollar. If this
were the case, the government would be incurring debt (and paying
interest) for no benefit or, even worse, actually harming the economy by
redirecting resources to less efficient uses than would have occurred had
the government left the money in the economy. The empirical evidence of
51

Olivier Blanchard, What Do We Know About Macroeconomics that Fisher and Wicksell Did
Not?, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1375, 1385–86 (2000).
52
See, e.g., BACKHOUSE, supra note 46, at 127 (“[Fiscal] policy could not be used to stabilize the
economy. The best policy was to minimize disturbances to the economy by ensuring that monetary
policy did not itself become a source of disturbance.”); Alan J. Auerbach, Is There a Role for
Discretionary Fiscal Policy?, in RETHINKING STABILIZATION POLICY: A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 109, 144–45 (2002), http://www.frbkc.org/publicat/
sympos/2002/pdf/S02auerbach.pdf.
53
See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1867–1960 (1963). Monetarists such as Friedman have been considered critics of Keynes
within the context of the IS-LM model, rather than critics of the model itself. See De Vroey, supra
note 47, at 6–7; BACKHOUSE, supra note 46, at 121 (“Friedman’s . . . theory rests on a theoretical
foundation that is just as informal as Keynes’s.”).
54
For a good nontechnical summary of the concept, see John Quiggin, The Big Issues in
Macroeconomics: The Fiscal Multiplier, COMMENT. ON AUSTRALIAN & WORLD EVENTS FROM A SOC.DEMOCRATIC PERSP. (Jan. 4, 2013), http://johnquiggin.com/2013/01/04/the-big-issues-in-macro
economics-the-fiscal-multiplier.
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the multiplier effect is unclear, leading some to call for more targeted
demand stimulus focused on high multiplier sectors55 and others to call for
the end of demand stimulus altogether.56
These challenges to traditional Keynesian macroeconomics formed the
basis for the so-called “New Classical” movement in macroeconomics. The
New Classical movement rejected the Keynesian approach and instead
adopted microeconomic foundations—taking into account the reactions of
rational actors in the model of the economy—into its model.57 The New
Classical movement effectively replaced the Keynesian approach to
macroeconomics with an attempt to extrapolate the macroeconomy based
on rational reactions in a so-called “general equilibrium” framework.58
Thus, the New Classical movement was much more than a challenge to the
conclusions of Keynesian economics—it was a challenge to its
fundamental premise.59
Under the New Classical model, neither monetary nor fiscal policy
mattered per se. Rather, what mattered was how policy differed from the
expectations of the market. The conclusion was that maintaining a stable
fiscal and monetary policy consistent with the rational expectations of the
market was more important than using either to stimulate the economy as a
whole.
New Classical economists also criticized the contention that
government borrowing to finance demand stimulus was essentially free.
Instead, New Classical economists concluded that raising taxes to repay
government debt or taxes used to pay for demand stimulus was itself a drag
on the economy. To the extent the economic losses caused by higher taxes
or higher interest rates resulting from government borrowing outweighed
any stimulative effects of the initial spending, demand stimulus would
always be a bad idea. Taken together, these attacks from New Classical
economists caused traditional Keynesian macroeconomics to fall into
disfavor.60
A potential synthesis of neoclassical macroeconomics and Keynesian
economics arose in response to the New Classical movement, sometimes
referred to as New Keynesian macroeconomics. New Keynesian
macroeconomics attempted to resolve the theory behind demand stimulus
55

See JANE G. GRAVELLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34349, ECONOMIC STIMULUS
PROPOSALS FOR 2008: AN ANALYSIS 17–18 (2008).
56
See, e.g., Kevin A. Hassett, Why Fiscal Stimulus Is Unlikely to Work, 12 INT’L FIN. 75 (2009).
57
See BACKHOUSE, supra note 46, at 123.
58
This was represented perhaps most famously by Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent. See Alan S.
Blinder, Keynes, Lucas, and Scientific Progress, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 130 (1987); De Vroey, supra
note 47, at 1, 9–11.
59
This is sometimes referred to as the Walrasian model of macroeconomics. See De Vroey, supra
note 47, at 10.
60
See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29, 32–34 (2006).
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with the microeconomic foundations and empirical results underlying the
New Classical movement, explicitly incorporating microeconomic concepts
of behavioral responses into their models, among other things.61
For example, New Keynesians proposed that prices could be “sticky”
in that they did not float to match reductions in demand. If prices were
sticky, inflation (and thus monetary policy) might have a short-term impact
on unemployment, even if it did not have a long-term one.62 In such a case,
for example, fiscal stimulus paid for with taxes on capital would have a
positive multiplier effect because consumption would rise to the sticky
price when the price could not drop to the lowered demand.63 This positive
multiplier would justify government stimulus, but only if it were targeted at
the appropriate group where there were sticky prices, and thus the largest
multiplier.
New Keynesian macroeconomics overcame a lot of the New Classical
movement’s criticisms of traditional Keynesian macroeconomics, and
could actually provide direct policy prescriptions, depending on the
assumptions.64 A problem with New Keynesian economics, however, was
that taking the lessons of the models to their logical extremes often led to
contradictory policy results.65 This led critics to challenge the entire
exercise of incorporating microeconomic foundations into macroeconomics

61

See id. at 34–37; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Alternative Approaches to Macroeconomics: Methodological
Issues and the New Keynesian Economics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3580,
1993), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3580.
62
See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard & Jordi Galí, Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model,
39 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 35, 55 (2007).
63
See, e.g., Tommaso Monacelli & Roberto Perotti, Redistribution and the Multiplier, 59 IMF
ECON. REV. 630, 631–32 (2011), available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/imfer/journal/v59/n4/
pdf/imfer201126a.pdf. Along these lines, there is a growing body of evidence supporting a higher
multiplier effect than previously thought. See Olivier Blanchard & Daniel Leigh, Growth Forecast
Errors and Fiscal Multipliers (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/13/1, 2013),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1301.pdf. Similarly, if interest rates were at the lower
bound, a higher multiplier effect for government spending could be effective as compared to when
interest rates were positive. See Lawrence Christiano et al., When Is the Government Spending
Multiplier Large? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15394, 2009), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15394; Gauti B. Eggertsson, What Fiscal Policy Is Effective at Zero
Interest Rates? (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 402, 2009),
http://newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr402.pdf.
64
See, e.g., John F. Cogan et al., New Keynesian Versus Old Keynesian Government Spending
Multipliers, 34 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 281 (2010); Bruce Greenwald & Joseph Stiglitz, New
and Old Keynesians, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (1993).
65
See David Colander, Post Walrasian Macroeconomics: Some Historic Links, in POST
WALRASIAN MACROECONOMICS: BEYOND THE DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
46, 64–67 (David Colander ed., 2006).
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at all, either returning to original Keynesian economics or adopting an
entirely new approach.66
One such new approach was the emergence of the Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium model, or DSGE. In short, the New Classical and New
Keynesian models both adopted a general equilibrium approach to
macroeconomics, incorporating microeconomic foundations into models to
determine the overall effect on the economy. DSGE extended and
formalized this, taking the empirical realities of the economy and monetary
policy effects as a starting point and then attempting to craft robust
macroeconomic models that would produce those results. To do so, it
introduced “stochastic” changes, or random shocks, to determine changes
to the general equilibrium model.67 While successful in achieving its stated
goals, to critics, the complexity and assumptions necessary to effectuate
DSGE models often made them nearly meaningless in terms of actual
policy recommendations.68
At present, it is safe to say that there is no consensus among
Keynesians, Monetarists, New Classical theorists, New Keynesians, or
DSGE theorists regarding the proper role of fiscal policy in addressing
macroeconomic conditions.69 Correspondingly, the deep disconnect among
policymakers as to the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stimulus is
more a reflection of the state of disarray in modern macroeconomics than
any fundamental policy or political disagreement. This has led some to
claim that modern macroeconomic theory is not particularly helpful in
setting real-world policy.70 But this cannot be completely correct. Taxes
and spending clearly have an impact on the economy as a whole, and
macroeconomic fiscal policy should be looked to at least in instances when
traditional monetary policy tools appear exhausted.71
Given what we know about the incidence of the corporate tax, what
does it tell us about how corporate taxes should respond in the face of a
recession? With traditional monetary policy stimulus virtually exhausted,72
66

In other words, what good is a theory if it does not comply with empirics, and what good are
empirics if they cannot lead to a theory? See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard, The State of Macro, 1 ANN. REV.
ECON. 209, 223–25 (2009).
67
See MICHAEL WICKENS, MACROECONOMIC THEORY: A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
APPROACH 4–10 (2d ed. 2011).
68
See id. at 7 (“Krugman . . . claims that the macroeconomics of the last thirty years is
spectacularly useless at best . . . .”).
69
See Blanchard, supra note 66.
70
See Giuseppe Fontana, Whither New Consensus Macroeconomics? The Role of Government and
Fiscal Policy in Modern Macroeconomics 19 (The Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 563, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410615.
71
See id.; John B. Taylor, Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 29
(2000).
72
See Jeffrey M. Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Outlook (Oct. 15,
2012), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/press_room/speeches/president_jeff_lacker/2012/lack
er_speech_20121015.cfm.
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economists have recently returned to the idea of using fiscal policy as a
form of macroeconomic stimulus.73 The problem with doing so, however,
especially in the context of corporate income taxes, is that economists
cannot agree on what form of fiscal stimulus is appropriate. For example,
so-called supply-side theorists would say examples like GA in Part I.B of
this Article prove that corporate taxes need to be lowered in a recession to
improve employment, while so-called demand-side theorists would
disagree, saying examples like GA prove that the problem is not corporate
taxes but lack of demand for new cars.74
Other critics respond that fiscal stimulus leads to budget deficits,
which can actually be counterproductive if fears of government defaults,
bailouts, or both lead to spikes in long-term interest rates.75 The response to
this, of course, is to raise revenue to reduce budget deficits.76 Thus,
demand-side proponents might oppose reductions in the corporate tax, but
also support increasing the corporate tax in the face of a recession to pay
for other demand stimulus.77 Supply-side theorists would contend that this
is exactly backwards because increasing taxes on employers leaves less
money to invest in new production, meaning less investment in growth and
thus higher unemployment.
But there is another option: firms could just pocket the money from
tax cuts and continue to lay off workers.78 Assuming labor in a recession
becomes highly inelastic, in that workers have few available options,
capital has little incentive to share any tax savings with them, at least under
a wage bargaining model. This does not necessarily mean demand-side
proponents are correct, however. While it is true on average that increased
cash flow to unemployed workers will tend to be consumed, increasing
73

See, e.g., Olivier Blanchard et al., Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy, 42 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 199, 205–06 (2010).
74
See, e.g., Jeffrey Miron, The Case Against the Fiscal Stimulus, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519,
520–25 (2010). This Article generally only considers fiscal policy and not monetary policy, which
could also be used to stimulate demand through lower interest rates or other increases in the money
supply due to the assumption that monetary policy has been constrained or maximized.
75
See, e.g., Gregory Hoelscher, New Evidence on Deficits and Interest Rates, 18 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 1 (1986).
76
The problem, of course, is—who should be taxed? Under this approach, much like the saying
famously attributed to Willie Sutton, go where the money is . . . , that is, tax owners of capital. See
WILLIE SUTTON WITH EDWARD LINN, WHERE THE MONEY WAS: THE MEMOIRS OF A BANK ROBBER
(Broadway Books 2004) (1976).
77
See Diane Lim Rogers, Why Cutting Taxes to Help the Economy Isn’t So Easy, 132 TAX NOTES
301, 303 (2011). The reality of course is not as clean as a dollar-for-dollar increase in unemployment
insurance paid for by an increase in corporate tax rates. Rather, one approach adopted during this
current recession has been a payroll tax holiday for workers (intended to increase take-home pay for
labor) without reducing corporate taxes. See Robert H. Frank, The Payroll Tax Needs a Vacation, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2011, at BU4; Nicola M. White, Payroll Tax Holiday Plan Draws Criticism from Left,
129 TAX NOTES 1304 (2010).
78
See Rogers, supra note 77, at 301–02.
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aggregate demand, this does not necessarily mean that such increased
demand would be high enough to stimulate corporations to increase hiring
(or decrease layoffs).79
Both theories think of taxes as a form of macroeconomic policy,
although in different directions: increasing the amount of money in a
particular area will lead to increased amounts of activity in that area.80
What lessons can be taken away, then, for fiscal policy in the modern
economy? Primarily that the lessons from macroeconomics cannot be
ignored in crafting fiscal policy, but, at the same time, no one clear policy
prescription emerges from modern macroeconomics.
This does not mean that policymakers cannot use the lessons from
macroeconomics to improve the design and structure of the modern
corporate income tax. As recent events indicate, doing nothing is not
neutral. To the extent the economy is fundamentally changing, the
efficiency and distributive consequences of the corporate income tax must
be taken into account in crafting any fiscal policy responses.
For example, take the debate over so-called corporate integration. The
integration debate concedes that corporations are efficient vehicles to
collect taxes, as they are effectively large pools of capital, but argues that
there should not be two layers of tax on corporations.81 Several different
policies have emerged out of the integration debate, but two of the primary
ones are the dividend exemption and shareholder tax credit models. Under
the dividend exemption model, the corporation would pay tax on its income
but not on its dividends paid to shareholders.82 Under the shareholder tax
credit model, the corporation would pay tax on both its income and its
dividends paid to shareholders, but the shareholders would be entitled to a
credit equal to their pro rata share of the corporate tax paid.83
Regardless of the details, the corporate integration proposals mostly
assume that shareholders bear the bulk of the incidence of the corporate
tax.84 If, however, labor bears a significant portion of the corporate tax, this
79

See Deborah Maranville, Unemployment Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern
Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2004).
80
See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on
Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2002).
81
See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 1–14 (1992), available at http://www.treasury.gov/re
source-center/tax-policy/Pages/integration-paper.aspx#summary.
82
See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of Corporate and Individual Income
Taxes: An Introduction, 84 TAX NOTES 1767, 1769 (1999).
83
See id.; R. Glenn Hubbard, Corporate Tax Integration: A View from the Treasury Department,
7 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 122–23 (1993).
84
For a more detailed description, see Adam H. Rosenzweig, Affirmative, in The Future of
Corporate Tax Reform: A Debate—Resolution #2: “Be it resolved that, assuming integration is
desirable, the best way to achieve it is by exempting dividends from taxation in shareholders’ hands,”
33 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N NEWSQUARTERLY 10, 10–11 (2013).
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analysis may not hold. For example, granting a dollar-for-dollar credit to
shareholders for corporate tax paid could overcompensate shareholders
who do not, in fact, bear the entire cost of the corporate tax. In fact, it could
reinforce the incentive to shift the cost of the corporate tax onto another
constituency, since shareholders would receive the credit regardless of who
bears the cost of the tax. If true, this would undermine the efficiency
analysis of a shareholder tax credit model, at least one designed to be dollar
for dollar. To the extent the push for a shareholder tax credit integration
model is efficiency driven, therefore, reconsideration may be necessary.
The same analysis holds for any attempt to use the corporate income
tax in a way that requires understanding its incidence. For example, the
corporate tax has been looked to as a tool for combating unemployment
over the past several years.85 But if the above incidence analysis is correct,
the tools proposed and adopted could be ineffective or, even worse,
counterproductive.
Notice what such an approach does, and equally as important, does not
do. By taking into account the impact of macroeconomic conditions on
traditional microeconomic decisionmaking, previously unaccounted for
distortions can be identified; correcting these distortions could, depending
on all the moving parts, lead to efficiency gains in the income tax. But in
addition, for the first time, since the improvement would take into account
macroeconomic trends, it could also have a positive feedback effect on the
macroeconomic condition of the economy. Contrast this to the more
traditional use of fiscal policy as a macroeconomic tool, such as fixeddollar hiring tax credits intended to increase hiring and stimulate demand,
in which distortions to individual employers’ decisionmaking are tolerated
for potential macroeconomic benefits.86
This is not to say that all monetary and fiscal responses to
macroeconomic conditions are unnecessary or inappropriate, or to obviate
the need for the Federal Reserve to set short-term interest rates or the
government to adopt Keynesian-type stimulus or other responses. Rather,
taking into account the impact of macroeconomic conditions into a
traditional microeconomic analysis of the corporate income can uncover
both efficiency benefits and macroeconomic benefits through a single
mechanism. The remainder of this Article will consider one example of
such an approach, the DST.
B. Conceptualizing a New Fiscal Policy: An Introduction to the DST
Corporate profits are at all-time highs while unemployment remains
stubbornly high; it is unclear who will gain from any future growth—labor
85

See, e.g., Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 101, 124 Stat.
71, 72–73 (2010).
86
See infra Part III.A.1.
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or capital.87 In fact, stubbornly high unemployment has been the defining
characteristic of the U.S. economy since the Great Recession of 2008.
Regardless of the particular position, economists and policymakers seem to
agree that their macroeconomic theories of fiscal policy are, at best, only
indirectly related to unemployment.88 The incidence analysis in Part I
demonstrates that corporate income taxes could well have played some role
in creating or exacerbating such unemployment.89 So if the debate over
fiscal policy turns primarily on “jobs, jobs, jobs,”90 why not directly tie tax
rates to increasing jobs?91 This is the ultimate premise of the DST.92
In essence, the DST takes the shifting elasticities of labor and capital
in a recession and the resulting shift in the incidence of corporate tax on the
margins as a given. Under this assumption, higher corporate taxes will tend
to shift onto labor in a recession while savings from lower corporate taxes
will tend to go to either consumers (in the form of lower prices) or capital.93
To directly address unemployment, therefore, one must tie corporate taxes
directly to employment.
The DST does this by replacing the current fixed corporate tax rate
with a formula. The formula begins on a year-to-year basis with the
preferred initial corporate tax rate, which could be any politically
determined amount as appropriate for corporations during the period in
87

Irwin, supra note 33.
See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 77.
89
See Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of Budget
Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 564–65 (2007).
90
Jim Kinney, Jobs Message Hammered Home, THE REPUBLICAN, May 28, 2011, at A05; Eugene
Robinson, Dear GOP: Cuts Alone Won’t Cut It, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2011, at A17; Eugene Robinson,
What’s the Big Idea?, WASH. POST, July 29, 2011, at A19. This is not necessarily the case, but it is an
assumption that will be made for purposes of this Article, especially since under at least the Atkinson
and Stiglitz model, increased employment in a world with nonmarket clearing wages will always
increase welfare. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
91
Cf. Peter Orszag, Link U.S. Payroll Tax Holiday to Unemployment Rate, BLOOMBERG (June 30,
2011, 7:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-30/payroll-tax-should-be-linked-to-un
employment-rate-peter-orszag.html.
92
Directly tying tax policy to macroeconomic decisionmaking represents an emerging trend in the
tax literature. See Yair Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy Through the Income Tax Code, 123 TAX
NOTES 1575 (2009). What is unique about the DST is that it uses corporate tax incidence as the tool to
tie corporate tax policy with macroeconomic policy, as opposed to a more generalized and indirect
across-the-board increase or decrease in tax rate.
93
Cf. Francesco Daveri & Guido Tabellini, Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial
Countries, 15 ECON. POL’Y 47 (2000); see also José M. González-Páramo, Imperfect Factor Mobility,
Unemployment, and the Incidence of Selective Capital Income Taxes 46 (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales,
Working Paper No. 11, 2003), http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/libros/Investiga
ciones/Inves2003_11.pdf (“Thus, if the employment effect of the tax is positive (negative), policies
intended to increase the degree of capital mobility will further increase (reduce) the level of
employment, with the sensitivity of this relationship being greater the smaller is the initial degree of
factor mobility. . . . This implies in turn that taxes which harm capital the most are best from the
employment perspective.”).
88
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which the economy is not in a period of high unemployment (under current
law the corporate tax rate is 35%).94 This rate would then be increased or
decreased each year on a corporation-by-corporation basis95 based on the
particular corporation’s percentage increase or decrease in employment,96
returning to the baseline rate in each subsequent year. In this manner, the
corporate tax rate would directly relate to employers’ cost–benefit analysis
in the decision to lay off workers or increase hiring.97
A dynamic, self-adjusting tax rate like the one described above is not
in itself a new idea.98 What is new is incorporating the concept of a
dynamic, self-adjusting tax into the corporate income tax so as to minimize
distortions to the incidence of the corporate tax caused by macroeconomic
conditions.
Returning to the GA example from Part I.B, but with the addition of a
simplified corporate income tax, assume there is a 35% corporate income
tax on the profits of the corporation. In a typical year, GA would earn a
pretax profit of $5 million, incurring a tax liability of $1.75 million and
leaving a net after-tax profit of $3.25 million for its shareholders. If we
further assume that in a typical year GA has maximized the efficiency of its
labor pool (meaning it cannot reduce salary because employees would
simply go work somewhere else), the market will not bear any increase in
the price of the cars (because buyers would just buy cars from somewhere
else), and there is no untaxed competitive industry, all $1.75 million of tax
is effectively borne by capital.
Now assume that a deep recession arrives, with high, nationwide
unemployment. There are two effects on the economy: first, as jobs become
scarcer, employees at GA are less likely to find alternative employment,
and second, as fewer people have jobs, there is less demand for GA’s cars.
The combination of these two effects has a significant impact on the
incidence of the corporate tax, holding everything else constant.99 GA
94

I.R.C. § 11(b)(1)(D) (2012) (imposing 35% tax rate on corporations with taxable income
exceeding $10,000,000).
95
It is this targeted response, among other things, that differentiates the DST from other proposals
to adjust the payroll tax to overall unemployment rates. See Orszag, supra note 91.
96
The one-for-one nature of this proposal is mostly for simplicity and as a starting point. There is
no reason why the formula could not change the tax rate by 0.5% for each 1% change in employment,
or even change the tax rate by the log of the employment, or exponentially, or some other number. This
would be both a political and empirical question, but for purposes of this part of the Article, a one-forone ratio is sufficient. Part III.A.3 will discuss some potential alternatives to take into account structural
rather than firm-by-firm unemployment.
97
For a general analysis of the marginal impact of fiscal policy on employment decisions, see Peter
Birch Sørensen, Public Finance Solutions to the European Unemployment Problem?, 12 ECON. POL’Y
221 (1997).
98
See Vito Tanzi, A Proposal for a Dynamically Self-adjusting Personal Income Tax, 21 PUB. FIN.
507 (1966) (proposing a self-adjusting personal income tax to prevent capital crowd out).
99
Of course, in the real world not everything is held constant. Rather, all that is needed for the
argument to hold, at least in part, is for the elasticity of labor to decrease more than the elasticity of
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cannot raise prices in the face of a recession; if anything, it might need to
drop prices in the face of decreased demand for cars. GA is able to reduce
labor costs, however, since the employees of GA have nowhere else to go.
There are many ways GA could shift the incidence of the tax onto labor,
but for simplicity assume GA uses layoffs as the way to do so.
Now assume GA’s sales drop 20% due to the recession. In the original
example, GA correspondingly reduced its labor cost by 20%. By doing so,
it continued to sell only 800 cars but increased its profits from $1 million to
$2 million. As a result, however, GA increased its corporate income tax
from $350,000 to $700,000. The owners of GA now face a choice. If they
bear the incidence of this additional $350,000 in tax, the total profits after
tax, after layoff, would be $1.3 million, as compared to $3.25 million
before the recession. However, due to the recession, they have another
choice—cut labor costs even further to increase the after-tax profits.
Assume GA does so, saving $1 million and increasing pretax profits to
$3 million and after-tax profits to $1.95 million.100 The effective result is
that the bulk of the incidence of the corporate tax on the original $2 million
of pretax profit has shifted from capital to labor, solely due to the change in
the relative elasticities of the two caused by the recession.101 In other words,
even though capital is losing real money in the recession, capital no longer
bears any of the tax on these smaller profits. In contrast, prior to the
recession, capital bore the entire cost of the corporate tax on the higher
profits it earned.
Of course, everyone (including capital) would prefer to sell more cars
and make more money, even if it meant bearing the incidence of the
corporate tax. Given the reality of decreased demand due to the recession,
however, capital will have an incentive to shift some or all of the corporate
tax burden to labor, at least as compared to pre-recession times.
Continuing with the GA example, on an after-tax basis, the
shareholders of GA earn $3.25 million in a pre-recession year and
approximately $1.95 million in a recession year—a drop of approximately
40%. A 40% drop in after-tax profit is significant to be sure, but nowhere
near the 80% drop in before-tax profits. Essentially, in this example the
interaction of the corporate income tax and the relative elasticities of
capital during periods of deep unemployment. Assuming some alternative investment is available,
either internationally or through U.S. Treasury Bonds, capital will always have some elasticity while
labor is generally considered a much less elastic base. See Felix & Hines, supra note 36, at 3 (surveying
studies finding up to 70% of the incidence of the corporate tax falls on labor when capital is mobile).
100
GA would also have to increase productivity from the remaining employees to continue
producing the 800 cars, but that does not impact the analysis so will be disregarded for purposes of this
section. See infra Part III.A.4 for a discussion of productivity innovation.
101
Of course in reality the numbers would be different in that the relative elasticities would be
continuous and reduced pay and benefits such as pension contributions and health care contributions
would also be used to reduce labor costs rather than just layoffs, but for purposes of this Article the
example is sufficient.
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capital and labor act as a form of implicit subsidy to capital, at the expense
of labor, during periods of deep unemployment.
Now introduce the DST. Under this scenario, GA would again face the
choice of bearing the burden of the tax on $2 million of pretax profit or
attempting to shift that burden to labor. In the case of the DST, however,
the shift to labor is no longer free. Rather, the initial reduction in payroll of
20% would increase the tax rate from 35% to 55%, meaning the total
corporate tax bill due on $2 million of pretax profit would no longer be
$700,000 but rather $1.1 million, leaving an after-tax profit of only
$900,000. GA may try to increase this amount further by reducing payroll
by another 20%, but doing so would increase the tax rate from 55% to
75%, resulting in pretax profit of $3 million but after-tax profit of only
$750,000, a net decrease. Assuming the shareholders of GA would rather
keep the $900,000 of after-tax profit with 20% reduction in payroll than the
$750,000 with 40% reduction in payroll, GA will not undertake the second
reduction in payroll. In this manner, the automatic and self-adjusting nature
of the DST would partially discourage shifting the incidence of the
corporate tax onto labor, but would not prevent reductions in payroll
arising as a result of real decreases in demand. At the same time, the
increasing tax rate would serve to raise additional revenue precisely when
needed most.
In effect, under the DST, the shareholders of GA would choose to bear
some of the incidence of the corporate tax rather than shift it onto labor—
the opposite of what occurs under the current fixed corporate tax rate.
Although the nominal tax rate increased due to the initial round of layoffs,
capital was still better off from a total after-tax profit standpoint as a result
of the layoffs; but, unlike before the DST, capital would be worse off from
the second round of layoffs due to the self-adjusting feature of the
corporate tax rate under the DST. Thus, under the DST, job losses would
be minimized as compared to what they otherwise would have been in the
face of reduced sales.
Unlike some fiscal stimulus proposals, however, these benefits would
not accrue only while the economy is shrinking and unemployment is
increasing. The reciprocal nature of the DST provides that if and when GA
hires new employees, it will face a lower marginal tax rate as well. For
example, assume in the next year demand returns and GA projects it will
sell 1000 cars again, and thus has to add 20% more in payroll (through
increased hours or hiring new workers). Absent the DST, GA would have
pretax profit of $5 million and after-tax profit of $3.25 million. With the
DST, the rate faced by GA would be reduced from 35% to 15%, resulting
in after-tax profit of $4.25 million—an increase of $1 million. GA,
knowing this to be the case, could use some or all of the $1 million to pay
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for the increase in salary.102 In the subsequent year when GA retains all
100 workers and sells 1000 cars, the rate will return to 35%. Since there
was no change in employment in that year, GA would return to making $5
million pretax profit and $3.25 million after-tax profit.
In effect, the DST operated to raise tax revenue in the face of layoffs,
which could be used to pay for demand stimulus, and then subsequently
subsidized hiring by cutting taxes when corporations hired to meet
increased demand. At the margins, on both the downturn and the upswing,
the DST served to incentivize employers to invest in labor. The DST in
effect, rather than providing a one-time subsidy to hiring only after massive
job losses have already occurred, served to smooth the impact of the severe
economic shock by slowing down the pace of layoffs during the downturn
and accelerating the pace of hiring in the upswing.103
The DST’s key insight is that macroeconomic trends can have
microeconomic effects—in this case, high unemployment in the economy
as a whole can affect the incentives of employers to hire and fire for tax
purposes. It is for this reason that the DST differs from some other recent
proposals to tie the tax rate to other metrics, such as taxing inequality,104
notwithstanding that they share a similar mechanism. Instead of proposing
to raise taxes as a form of punishment or to lower taxes as a form of
subsidy, the DST attempts to reduce existing tax-induced distortions from a
microeconomic standpoint while also addressing economy-wide issues
such as high unemployment and low aggregate demand. Because the DST
attempts to address both, it makes sense to examine how economists think
about the interaction of the micro- and macroeconomic analyses.

102

The match between the cost of hiring and the tax benefit is merely a coincidence of the numbers
used in this example. Challenges in calculating the specific rate will be discussed in more detail in
Part III. In reality, however, making a not unusual but somewhat strong assumption of constant
employment over time (that is, a natural rate of unemployment) and equal per unit profit, the netting
effect of the DST will wash out, meaning that it would have no net impact on an employer’s long-term
efficient level of employment. For a description of the natural rate of unemployment, see MANKIW,
supra note 50, ch. 22.
103
By resetting to the baseline each year, the DST should smooth the swings of hiring and firing in
the face of economic shocks caused by the implicit subsidy to employers, providing the macroeconomic
employment benefit (holding monetary policy constant). Cf. MANKIW, supra note 50, at 495–503.
104
See Ian Ayres & Aaron S. Edlin, Op-Ed., Don’t Tax the Rich. Tax Inequality Itself, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2011, at A29; Mark Schmitt, How Tax Reform Represents Obama’s Greatest Shot at Hope and
Change, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 24, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/92529/debt-ceilingtax-reform-inequality. These proposals are in the nature of Pigouvian taxes, that is, taxing something
bad to have less of it. See Agnar Sandmo, Pigouvian Taxes, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
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C. The DST as an Example of Integrating Macro and Micro Policy into
Tax Law
The challenge of the DST, or any fiscal policy response to
macroeconomic conditions, is to craft a policy that can maximize the
efficiency of the tax laws from a microeconomic perspective while also
taking into account desired macroeconomic policy goals related to issues
such as employment, interest rates, and public debt.
The basic idea behind the DST is to recognize the economic reality
that macroeconomic conditions can change the microeconomic analysis of
the tax laws, and that microeconomic decisionmaking can have different
macroeconomic consequences depending on the macroeconomic
conditions. In this manner, the DST directly confronts an unspoken
assumption in the tax literature: that very little is known theoretically or
empirically about how these two interact or operate within the tax laws.
Taking as a given, however, that the tax law applies to the economy as a
whole, directly confronting this question becomes rather important,
especially as policymakers increasingly look to fiscal policy as a
macroeconomic tool.105
The DST attempts to integrate these macroeconomic analyses of tax
policy into a more traditional microeconomic efficiency analysis to see if
any answers emerge. First, the DST asks if empirically identified
macroeconomic trends can impact the microeconomic decisionmaking
assumptions upon which tax policy analysis rests. Assuming the answer is
yes—that is, that higher rates of unemployment lead employers to act
differently with respect to taxes—the question that arises is whether a
change to the tax law is available to minimize these distortions, and thereby
minimize deadweight loss (or pure social waste), while raising the same
amount of revenue.106
The DST does this by crafting a policy that offsets incentives on an
employer-by-employer basis. Specifically, the DST ensures employers no
longer have an incentive to change from an efficient level of employment
solely to shift the incidence of the corporate tax onto labor. Properly
structured, as discussed in more detail below, the DST would reach only
this tax-induced behavior, making it more efficient than current tax policy.
Thus, from a traditional microeconomic standpoint, the DST makes sense
as a tax policy tool, under the crucial but realistic assumption that changes
in macroeconomic conditions distort incentives to employers on the
margins.

105

See, e.g., Listokin, supra note 92; see also Klein, supra note 17, at 590 (“In order to know what
nontax variables need to be taken into account and to know how to correct for them so as to isolate the
effect of the tax variable, it is necessary to have some theory about how the economy operates . . . .”).
106
See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL
L. REV. 1627 (1999).
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But what about the DST’s impact on macroeconomic conditions more
broadly? Could the DST be used to reduce unemployment across the entire
economy? This is a much harder question, especially given the uncertain
state of macroeconomic theory generally.107 Even so, looking at the DST as
a whole, it is possible that the DST could achieve these macroeconomic
goals under most modern theories of macroeconomics.
The DST has two potential, and reciprocal, employment benefits.
First, the DST removes the incentives of employers to increase
unemployment during a downturn, at least as a means to shift the incidence
of the corporate tax, which results in marginally less severe downturns in
the business cycle. Second, the DST provides an incentive for employers to
hire as the economy picks up, accelerating periods of growth out of a
recession.
Taken together, the DST’s employment benefits should have a
smoothing effect on employment over the business cycle, which is
important because of the concept of the natural rate of unemployment.108
The natural rate of unemployment theory stands for the proposition that the
economy, absent swings from the business cycle, has a single “proper” rate
of unemployment. Divergences from this natural rate of unemployment are
troubling because they indicate something is wrong, that is, the economy is
either above or below its natural rate.109 Accordingly, stabilizing these
swings under the natural rate of unemployment theory, such as would occur
under the DST, would create macroeconomic benefits.110
Even under a theory of macroeconomics that does not hold to a natural
rate of unemployment, the DST should have a positive impact on growth.
For instance, assuming a high multiplier effect of demand stimulus, the
government should spend on demand stimulus during periods of high
unemployment. The problem is that borrowing to do so can increase total
debt in the economy. What this means is that, as the economy begins to
grow again, and demand for credit increases, there will be less capital
available to lend within the private sector. This, in turn, leads to spikes in
long-term interest rates, which then undercut long-term growth and
employment under this theory.111 The threat of long-term interest rate
107

See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, The Inexorable and Mysterious Tradeoff Between Inflation and
Unemployment, 111 ECON. J. C45, C47–C48 (2001).
109
See Hian Teck Hoon & Edmund S. Phelps, Macroeconomic Shocks in a Dynamized Model of
the Natural Rate of Unemployment, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 889 (1992); Edmund S. Phelps,
Macroeconomics for a Modern Economy, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 543, 549–50 (2007).
110
See Mankiw, supra note 50, ch. 22 (describing the natural rate of unemployment theory); see
also Per Krusell et al., Is Labor Supply Important for Business Cycles? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 17779, 2012), http://app.ny.frb.org/research/economists/sahin/KMRS4_
EFG.pdf.
111
See, e.g., Olivier J. Blanchard, Current and Anticipated Deficits, Interest Rates and Economic
Activity, 25 EUR. ECON. REV. 361, 379 (1984).
108
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spikes, at least under this theory, makes debt-financed demand stimulus
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.
The potential remedy to this is a “credible commitment” by the
government to pay down the debt as soon as the economy begins to grow
again, although to date there has been little agreement as to what would
constitute a sufficiently credible commitment to achieve this goal.112 The
DST, by raising revenue during periods of demand stimulus and lowering
revenue during periods of growth, potentially avoids this problem. From at
least one macroeconomic standpoint, the permanent, reciprocal, and
automatic nature of the DST should make it roughly revenue neutral over
time,113 meaning fears of fiscal stimulus leading to huge budget deficits or
even potential government default along the lines of Greece114 should be
mitigated as well. Accordingly, fears of long-term interest rate spikes
should be reduced under the DST as compared to other forms of demand
stimulus.
Lastly, since the DST allocates the costs and benefits of fiscal policy
in a manner that, theoretically, should maximize the multiplier effect,115 it
should find support under New Keynesian approaches that favor focusing
demand stimulus on particular sectors of the economy rather than simply
stimulating the general economy as a whole. It is the unique attempt to
combine the benefits from all these disparate macroeconomic theories that
distinguishes the DST from other types of fiscal stimulus.
III. IMPLEMENTING A DYNAMIC, SELF-ADJUSTING CORPORATE TAX RATE:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES
A. Theoretical Benefits and Limitations of the DST
1. Why Not a Simple Hiring Tax Credit?—The immediate question
that arises from any discussion of a proposal to use the tax system to reduce

112

See James D. Hamilton & Marjorie A. Flavin, On the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A
Framework for Empirical Testing, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 808 (1986).
113
In general, raising revenue to offset fiscal stimulus through a permanent and automatic
mechanism such as the DST could theoretically satisfy the “credible commitment” necessary to
minimize the concern over future deficits and thus increases in the long-term interest rate. See
Countries Face Choices to Reduce Debt and Deficits, IMF SURVEY (Dec. 17, 2010),
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/POL121710A.htm (“Fiscal stimulus needs to be
combined with a credible commitment to a medium-term fiscally responsible policy . . . .” (quoting
Alan Auerbach)).
114
See Michael G. Arghyrou & John D. Tsoukalas, The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes,
Mechanics and Outcomes (CESifo, Working Paper No. 3266, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1719032.
115
See, e.g., Tommaso Monacelli & Roberto Perotti, Redistribution and the Multiplier 36
(Innocenzo Gasparini Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 409, 2011), available at http://econ
papers.repec.org/paper/igiigierp/409.htm.
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unemployment is: why not just directly pay corporations to hire people?116
Why not use a relatively simple fixed-dollar hiring tax credit instead of this
more complicated mechanism? For example, why not wait until the
National Bureau of Economic Research declares a recession to implement
an across-the-board or targeted tax break for employers?
A fixed-dollar tax credit approach might satisfy one theory of
macroeconomic stimulus, but it fails others. Since macroeconomics as a
field cannot say with certainty which approach dominates, it is difficult to
justify basing policy on only one theory over another. This is not to say that
any one fiscal policy approach necessarily must displace all others; in fact,
a policy such as the DST would not displace the need for broader
macroeconomic policy more generally, whether monetary or fiscal. It is
even possible that specific tax proposals such as a fixed-dollar hiring credit
could be a good idea in addition to the DST. In fact, the DST is structured
to make macroeconomic conditions more stable and thus potentially make
tolls such as the fixed-dollar hiring credit more robust.
The real problem with temporary and targeted tax cuts as the only or
primary means of addressing unemployment in the face of a recession is
that they could prove distortive to the efficient allocation of resources,
meaning not only that such a proposal could have little macroeconomic
benefit, but that it also could potentially increase deadweight loss. Only a
permanent, comprehensive approach can address all of these considerations
at the same time. Of course, permanent solutions raise other, sometimes
difficult, questions, but none of these negate the benefits of taking a
comprehensive look at fiscal policy from both a micro- and
macroeconomic point of view.
Assuming one were forced to choose between fiscal policy
instruments, there are three reasons why the DST would be preferable to a
simple fixed-dollar hiring tax credit. First and foremost, the largest benefit
of the DST is that it is tailored to individual employers. Each employer best
knows its own business and its labor needs. The purpose of the DST is to
allow employers to make the most efficient employment decisions absent
taxes and only then have the tax mechanism kick in to prevent layoffs from
being used solely to shift the incidence of the corporate income tax. It does
so by using tax rates, which apply only to taxable income (gross profits less
expenses, such as wages); as wages go down, profits go up (holding all else
equal). The more a company increases profits through layoffs or other labor
costs, the more it will pay through the DST, not only through the increased
rate, but also by applying the increased rate to a larger taxable income base.
By using rates applied to taxable income, the DST actually has two self116

Such an approach would more closely resemble a Pigouvian tax rather than an attempt at
maximizing the efficiency of the tax laws on its own terms. See supra note 104. Regardless, this
approach has effectively been U.S. policy in recent years. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 102, 124 Stat. 71, 75–76 (2010).

1058

108:1029 (2014)

A Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-adjusting Corporate Tax Rate

adjusting features, the rate and the base. Conversely, if a company were
unable to make a profit despite laying off workers, the DST would have no
negative impact for the simple reason that any tax rate multiplied by zero
profits will always be zero.117
By contrast, any fixed-dollar, “one size fits all” solution would not
have this automatic adjustment quality in that it would be worth the same
amount per employee regardless of the profits of the employer.118 Thus,
fixed-dollar credits do not necessarily target those firms that need the most
help, nor do they necessarily increase total employment if the only firms
that claim the credits would have hired anyway even absent the credit.119
Second, a fixed-dollar tax credit does not work on both the downside
and the upside. A credit for hiring new workers might provide an incentive
to hire on the margins, but it does nothing to dissuade tax-induced layoffs
in the first place. To the extent the problems created in the modern
economy are due to the intense and sudden increase in unemployment
during economic shocks, fixed-dollar hiring tax credits do nothing to
prevent this.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the reciprocal nature of the DST
is intended to undo an existing tax distortion to hiring decisions, which,
holding all else equal, creates a deadweight loss in the economy. Any “one
way” hiring credit not incorporating this feature, therefore, would be
addressing the distortion to hiring decisions on an imprecise level, if at all.
In other words, for a fixed-dollar credit to work, one would have to hope
that the size and scope of the fixed-dollar credit is precise enough to offset
both the hesitancy to hire out of the recession and the implicit subsidy to
layoffs in the first place; any subsidy in excess of the efficient amount
would lead to deadweight loss from inefficient hiring and any subsidy less
than the efficient amount would not return employers to the efficient hiring
level. The DST, by being reciprocal, automatic, and more finely tuned,
minimizes this risk. Relatedly, a fixed-dollar credit creates incentives for
employers to cheat the system by firing workers (which would have no tax
penalty) and then hiring new workers to replace them, solely to obtain the
credit.120 The DST does not create this incentive.
117

In fact, rather than be harmful, the higher tax rate of the DST could actually prove beneficial to
loss companies by increasing the value of their deductions. See infra Part III.B.2.
118
This is only completely true if the credit was refundable, but is still partially true even if it is
not. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006).
119
See infra Part III.A.3. There is evidence that the bulk of the benefit from fixed-dollar credits do
in fact benefit only such inframarginal hiring, thus causing pure waste from an economic standpoint.
See, e.g., John H. Bishop & Mark Montgomery, Does the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit Create Jobs at
Subsidized Firms?, 32 INDUS. REL. 289, 302 (1993).
120
See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act § 102(b) (“For purposes of this section, the
term ‘retained worker’ means any qualified individual (as defined in section 3111(d)(3) or section
3221(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)—(1) who was employed by the taxpayer on any date
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Third, any ad hoc solution faces two political economy problems:
(1) the need to pass any hiring credit through Congress and (2) the inability
of employers to plan for the credit in advance.121 The self-adjusting nature
of the DST addresses both of these problems. Because the DST adjusts tax
rates automatically, it would only require one vote by Congress—at the
time of enactment.122 Further, as discussed in more detail below, having the
self-adjusting tax embodied in current law would require corporate
employers to take the DST into account when reporting earnings and tax
liabilities on their yearly public financial statements, potentially giving the
DST current influence on corporate behavior with respect to future
decisions.123 This certainty supplements the smoothing effect over time,
providing an additional benefit over ad hoc solutions.
2. Why Only Public Corporations?—On its face, perhaps the DST’s
toughest challenge in combating actual unemployment rates is that not all
employers are corporations (or at least corporations subject to an entitylevel income tax). There are sole proprietorships, partnerships (including
limited liability companies treated like partnership for federal income tax
purposes), S Corporations, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs),124 and
tax-exempt organizations including Section 501(c)(3)125 organizations,126
among others, which represent a sizeable percentage of all employment in
the country. If employees working for corporations do not make up the
bulk of workers, why spend so much time creating a special tax rate only
for corporations to solve the unemployment problem?127
The short answer is: those entities do not pay income tax, so the
income tax cannot be used as a fiscal tool to impact their behavior. The
longer answer is: the DST is uniquely suited toward corporations due to the
nature of the incidence of the corporate tax, which does not apply to
entities that do not pay a net income tax.128
during the taxable year, (2) who was so employed by the taxpayer for a period of not less than 52
consecutive weeks, and (3) whose wages (as defined in section 3401(a)) for such employment during
the last 26 weeks of such period equaled at least 80 percent of such wages for the first 26 weeks of such
period.”). The DST avoids these problems by effectively penalizing the layoffs as well as subsidizing
the hiring.
121
See David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 752, 782 (2010).
122
Cf. id. at 771, 796.
123
See infra Part III.B.2.
124
There is some evidence that the use of REITs is actually growing as well. See Nathaniel Popper,
Restyled as Real Estate Trusts, Varied Businesses Avoid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2013, at A1.
125
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
126
E.g., organizations such as Washington University in Saint Louis. See University’s Tax Status,
WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://tax.wustl.edu/general/Pages/status.aspx (last visited June 8, 2014).
127
By contrast, virtually all employers pay payroll tax. See I.R.C. § 3111.
128
While the incidence analysis applies to all types of taxes, the unique nature of the income tax on
corporations as an entity separate from its owners makes the incidence analysis unique from other taxes,
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In addition, focusing on large corporations takes into account the
difference in size of the employment base. For example, if an employer
with five employees were to lay off one employee, under the DST that
employer would face a 20% increase in its marginal tax rate (assuming all
employees were equally compensated and the tax rate adjusted 1% for each
1% change in wage base).
Regardless of the relative benefits of marginally inducing employers
to bear the cost of the corporate tax, such a large increase would appear on
its face to be killing a gnat with a sledgehammer.129 Of course, this could be
resolved by changing the formula such that employers with a small number
of employees would face a lower marginal tax rate increase, say only 10%
of the decrease in their wage deduction, in which case the hypothetical
employer above would face only a 2% marginal tax rate increase. The
problem is that such a formula would result in negligible impacts on large
employers. For example, if a corporation employed 100,000 workers and
laid off 1000, that would represent only a 1% drop in employment
(assuming the workers are equally compensated for ease of calculation). As
a result, the employer would face only a 0.1% increase in marginal tax rate,
an amount unlikely to have any effect.
This does not mean that it would be impossible to create two DSTs,
one for large employers and one for small employers, but such a bifurcated
approach would significantly increase the complexity of the proposal
without necessarily targeting large amounts of workers. Thus, if choosing
between the two, on a case-by-case basis a DST on large employers would
have a greater impact because large corporations are the only ones that
engage in mass layoffs and mass hiring at any one point in time
(notwithstanding that small employers as a whole employ almost half of all
workers).130
Assuming this is correct, what remains is drawing a meaningful line
between large and small employers. The Internal Revenue Code currently
provides two models to do so. The first would be to define large employers
based on some arbitrary number of employees, revenues, or assets. For
example, the Internal Revenue Code exempts employers who employ at
least fifty employees in a separate line of business from certain pension
obligations131 and grants special reduced capital gains rates to shareholders
of corporations with gross assets below $50 million.132 The other approach
including flow-through entities which act solely as accounting mechanisms. See Harberger, supra
note 5, at 217–20.
129
Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 24 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court
uses a sledgehammer to kill a gnat . . . .”).
130
See Regina F. Burch, Financial Regulatory Reform Post-financial Crisis: Unintended
Consequences for Small Business, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 409, 410 (2010).
131
I.R.C. § 414(r).
132
Id. § 1202(a), (d).
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would be to define large employers as only publicly traded corporations.
For example, the Internal Revenue Code denies the ability to be treated as
fiscally transparent (with some limited exceptions) to publicly traded
entities133 and limits the application of certain “golden parachute” rules only
to publicly traded corporations.134 So which should it be—size or public
trading?
Based solely on the criteria of the Internal Revenue Code, no one
answer necessarily jumps out as obviously correct. The answer can become
clearer, however, when taking into account benefits outside the bounds of
the Internal Revenue Code. In particular, using public trading rather than
number of employees as the dividing line between small and large
employers begins to look especially attractive once one takes into account
nontax considerations. First, and perhaps most importantly, public trading
is a “sticky” line135 in that going public is already quite costly, so those
companies that go public must perceive significant value in doing so.136 For
instance, corporations desire to be publicly traded for a number of
reasons—cheaper access to capital markets, monetization by existing
shareholders, ease of valuation, equity compensation of management,
among others—but not necessarily for income taxes. In other words, if a
corporation wants to go public, it is not for tax reasons.137
Presumably, therefore, a corporation would be unlikely to change its
decision to go public solely because it may face the DST as a public
corporation as opposed to a fixed income tax rate as a private corporation.
This is especially true considering the DST could result in a lower tax rate
for the corporation if, for instance, the corporation planned on using
proceeds from its initial public offering to hire new workers as part of a
business expansion. Conversely, corporations do not necessarily go private
(that is, cease to be publicly traded) primarily for tax reasons. For example,
many corporations go private because they are being purchased by private
equity funds or other financial buyers for financial reasons.138
133

Id. § 7704.
Id. § 162(m)(1)–(2).
135
This is often thought of as the ideal place to impose a tax since a tax law which does not affect
behavior raises revenue without imposing a deadweight loss on society. See Weisbach, supra note 106.
But see Terrance O’Reilly, Principles of Efficient Tax Law: Apocrypha, 27 VA. TAX REV. 583 (2008).
136
See Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L.J. 649 (2008).
137
See Stephen J. Redner, Thinking of Going Public? Think Twice, Then Read the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act of 2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 521, 522 (2002); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a
New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 639, 641–43 (2009).
138
See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Essay, Deconstructing Equity: Public
Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 233–35 (2008).
Even this may not be as large as once thought, however. See Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public:
Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245 (2009). Other
corporations may go private because they become delisted from being too small to qualify for trading
on the exchange. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey et al., Down and Out in the Stock Market: The Law and
134
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This does not address one potential problem with going private, that is,
financial buyers who plan to lay off a substantial number of workers as cost
savings. Under this scenario, a company could engage in layoffs as a
private company, which, if done while public, would have led to a higher
tax rate. This effectively makes it cheaper for financial buyers to acquire
public companies (at least on the margin) for which it might have otherwise
been more efficient to remain public. This can be addressed, however, by
adding a transition rule. Specifically, the DST could apply to a corporation
for the entire taxable year in which it went private. Thus, if a buyer wanted
to use layoffs to finance an acquisition, it would have to artificially wait
until the beginning of the subsequent year to do so or artificially wait until
the end of the taxable year to acquire the company, imposing real risk in
the transaction.139 This risk could be avoided, however, by structuring the
transaction so it closes at the end of the taxable year of the public company.
There are limits to this,140 but if they prove insufficient, one solution could
be to “taint” the year following a year in which a company goes private by
making it subject to the DST as well. Regardless, this issue should only
apply to a relatively small number of companies and solutions are
available.
Contrast this to using number of employees (or payroll deductions) as
the dividing line between large and small employers. The primary issue
with using such an arbitrary bright line is that it creates a “cliff effect”—an
extremely high marginal tax on the action that crosses the line.141 Given this
cliff effect, firms face a choice: choose not to cross the line, or find some
other way to do so without falling off the cliff. This leads to the single
biggest problem with using number of employees as the dividing line: it
creates a powerful incentive for employers to “hide” full-time employees
by converting them into independent contractors or part-time workers.142 If
this incentive causes small employers to actually change their employment
methods from what would be preferred, it would be undesirable in that it
would impose a deadweight loss on society.143

Economics of the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON. 683 (2008). These situations only serve to further
the argument that using public trading as a proxy for size in the DST may be preferable.
139
This is precisely the approach adopted in other similar areas of the law, such as claiming a
foreign tax credit on dividends and certain similar items of income. See I.R.C. § 901(k), (l).
140
For example, one way to close the year would be to treat the acquisition as a purchase of assets,
but any built-in gain would effectively be subject to double tax, significantly raising the cost.
141
See Stephen D. Holt & Jennifer L. Romich, Marginal Tax Rates Facing Low- and ModerateIncome Workers Who Participate in Means-Tested Transfer Programs, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 259
(2007).
142
See Myron Hulen et al., Independent Contractors: Compliance and Classification Issues,
11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 13 (1994); Susan Schwochau, Note, Identifying an Independent Contractor for
Tax Purposes: Can Clarity and Fairness Be Achieved?, 84 IOWA L. REV. 163 (1998).
143
See Weisbach, supra note 106.
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Likewise, if this incentive results in employers simply playing games
to make it appear that their full-time employees are really something else
or—even worse—flat out defrauding the government, it would also be
undesirable because it would increase transaction costs (for example, by
paying for tax advisors) with no corresponding increase in social benefit. In
other words, since number of employees is less sticky than public trading,
both in actual and planning terms, it is a less desirable line to use in
imposing the DST. Using revenues as the dividing line suffers from the
same malady.144
3. Inframarginal Hiring.—One of the thorniest problems for any tax
incentive is the problem of inframarginal behavior, or behavior that would
have occurred absent the tax incentive. Inframarginal behavior is troubling
because a tax incentive is inefficient in such a case, since the taxpayer
would have undertaken the behavior even absent the tax incentive. Yet, the
taxpayer receives a windfall in the form of the tax benefit.145 Inframarginal
behavior is particularly troubling in the case of employment, since
presumably the primary reason for companies to hire or fire workers is for
business reasons, not tax reasons.
The immediate response to this concern is that the DST is no worse,
and should be better than, any other fiscal employment stimulus.146
Providing a hiring tax credit or payroll tax holiday to hiring workers is also
available regardless of whether the hiring would have occurred absent the
tax incentive.147 Given the nature of the world, it just is not possible to
create a counterfactual scenario after enacting a tax incentive in which the
144

In addition, it is possible that some companies have large revenues with very small payrolls, for
example if they are driven primarily by owning intellectual property. For instance, it is not hard to
imagine a company consisting of a small number of individuals who invent the greatest computer
software program of all time generating massive revenues with only a small staff. The primary
counterexample for a time was Facebook, which generated massive revenue and had a large employee
base, and yet remained private; Facebook was effectively forced to go public rather than file disclosures
with the SEC as a private company due to having over 500 shareholders. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
Questioning the 500 Equity Holders Trigger, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 43 (2011), http://www.hb
lr.org/?p=1028; Evelyn Rusli et al., The Education of Zuck, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2012, at BU1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/technology/facebooks-mark-zuckerberg-at-a-turningpoint.html?pagewanted=all.
145
See Michelle Scholastica Paul, Bridging the Gap to the Microfinance Promise: A Proposal for a
Tax-Exempt Microfinance Hybrid Entity, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1383, 1402–04 (2010).
146
See Batchelder et al., supra note 118, at 45–46 (arguing that a tax incentive need not be optimal
but rather the best “bang for its buck”).
147
See Bishop & Montgomery, supra note 119. This is the case for broad-based credits, but
targeted credits such as the previous tax credit for hiring Vietnam veterans carry less concern. See
Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 973, 1033–35 (1986) (“The credit for hiring economically disadvantaged Vietnam veterans is a
tax incentive which can survive both substantive and procedural scrutiny.”). Under the “nothing new
under the sun” heading, the United States recently enacted a similar hiring tax credit for Iraq and
Afghanistan war veterans. See Vow to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-56, §§ 201–265,
125 Stat. 711, 712–33.
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incentive is not part of the law. Thus, if it is agreed that some hiring tax
incentive is necessary, a more directly tailored tax incentive, such as the
DST, is more efficient than a broad-based fixed-amount hiring credit, even
if the DST is subject to the inframarginal problem.148
In this sense, however, the main drawback of the DST is the flip side
of one of its main strengths—that it is permanent. For this reason, it will
always apply to some hiring that would have occurred absent the DST,
unless one were to make the nonsensical assumption that no change in
employment would ever occur absent the DST. Theoretically, however, it is
possible that the DST would not impact efficient levels of hiring in the long
run because it is reciprocal, meaning the detriment when the rate goes up
would be offset by the benefit when the rate goes down.149
Even if the reciprocal nature of the DST did not result in completely
offsetting rates in the long run,150 the inframarginal problem should not
apply to the DST because it is intended to apply only to those changes in
payroll meant to shift the incidence of the corporate tax away from capital
and onto labor and not to any “real” employment decisions. The problem
with this answer, however, is building a rate mechanism in the real world
that would exempt “real” employment decisions and impact incidencebased decisions. To do so, ideally there would be some proxy for “real”
changes in employment on an employer-by-employer basis, which could be
backed out of the calculation, thereby reaching only payroll decisions
applicable to shifting the incidence of taxes.
One possibility would be for the DST mechanism to change tax rates
based on the percentage change in payroll for a corporation less the
percentage change in national unemployment rate for the same period. This
would allow the DST to capture an approximation of the firm-specific
change in employment as opposed to systemic changes in employment. In
other words, this approach would assume that changes in the national
unemployment rate reflect the inframarginal changes in employment by a
particular firm, and then only apply the DST to changes in excess of the
inframarginal changes.
This may not necessarily make sense, however, considering national
changes in unemployment are national averages and do not take into
account regional or sectoral differences in employment levels. For
example, certain states, such as California and Michigan, have suffered

148

Cf. Aki Kangasharju, Do Wage Subsidies Increase Employment in Subsidized Firms?,
74 ECONOMICA 51 (2007).
149
See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
150
This could be due to limitations on the ability to claim deductions, limitations on carrybacks or
carryforwards over years, or changes in the tax rate over time, among others. See Deborah H. Schenk,
Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 428–31 (2000).
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much deeper unemployment than other states in recent years.151 Similarly,
certain industries, such as construction, have suffered much deeper losses
than other industries, such as finance and health care.152 Thus, it might be
more appropriate to have a regionally or sectorally adjusted DST, backing
out the specific unemployment rate applicable to a particular employer and
then applying the DST to other changes in firm-by-firm employment.
The problem with taking these regional and sectoral differences into
account is that they still remain a rough proxy for individual firm
inframarginal hiring, although possibly a better one than national
unemployment. Thus, it may be more appropriate to analyze each firm’s
specific employment decisions with its specific profits as compared to
profits of competitors in its field. In this manner, issues common to all
competitors in a field would “wash out” and only firm-specific
employment decisions would remain.
For a simplistic example, assume an industry has two competitors:
General Automotive (GA) and United States Automotive (USA). GA has
pretax profits of $1 million and payroll of $2 million in Year 1, and USA
has pretax profits of $2 million and payroll of $4 million in Year 1. Both
GA and USA suffer a 25% reduction in sales in Year 2. USA reduces its
payroll by 12.5%, resulting in a payroll of $3.5 million and a profit of $2
million in Year 2. GA, however, reduces its payroll by 25% causing payroll
to drop to $1.5 million and pretax profits to increase to $1.25 million (for
the purposes of this example, presumably shifting some of the incidence of
the corporate tax onto labor). As a result, USA would have no increase in
its tax rate under the DST, while GA would face an increase of 12.5% in its
tax rate under the DST.
There are a few problems with such an approach, however. The first
problem is that certainty becomes reduced, thus diminishing some of the
DST’s incentive effect. If a company does not have access to the
employment decisions of competitors, it will not know what effect any
given level of change in its employment will have on its tax rate. Second,
such an approach substantially increases the complexity of administering
the DST because before a tax rate could be calculated, the taxpayer would
have to identify which companies are “competitors” and compare changes
in payroll among the competitors before a tax rate could be calculated.
Even assuming this were possible, it makes using the wage deduction on
the face of the tax return difficult because tax returns are confidential and
thus the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cannot share one corporation’s
payroll date with another corporation.153 Conversely, such an approach
151

See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Regional and State
Employment and Unemployment—September 2011 (Oct. 21, 2011).
152
See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment
Situation—October 2011, tbl.A-14 (Nov. 4, 2011).
153
I.R.C. § 6103 (2012).
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raises the specter of collusion among employers in sectors with few actors
and high barriers to entry. Competitors would have a huge incentive to
collude and agree to consistent levels of hiring and layoffs solely to
maximize the rent extraction from labor, much in the same way employer
collusion can extract rent from labor more generally.154 For these reasons,
even if it is a more blunt approach, it is arguably preferable to use publicly
available data that cannot be manipulated, such as regional or sectoral
changes in employment, rather than the more difficult to determine and
easier to manipulate taxable profits of individual firms.
Other proxies might be possible as well, such as using a weighted
average or a three-year average of employment changes, which would
smooth and net out the effects of inframarginal hiring by averaging the
effects over several years instead of looking on a single year-to-year
basis.155 Of course, no method would perfectly match the real-world
mechanism with the theoretical goal of acting only on the incidence of
corporate tax. Nonetheless, such proxies could result in fiscal stimulus
being more closely tailored to the ideal than other tax incentives for
employment, which even more indirectly address unemployment through
macroeconomic effects.156
4. Efficient Layoffs: Employment and Innovation.—A similar
concern to inframarginal hiring is efficient layoffs. Assume an employer
faces a substantial reduction in demand due to a recession. Rather than
reduce compensation to shift the cost of reduced sales onto the existing
labor pool, the employer could innovate a new process to manufacture a
good of equal quality that requires 20% less labor to produce. This increase
in production means that the marginal cost per unit of good decreases,
thereby increasing efficiency and thus social surplus. The result, however,
is a reduction in employment, which under the DST would result in a
higher marginal tax rate.
Traditional microeconomic efficiency analysis would say that
innovation is good because it increases total social surplus, even if it results
in the loss of a job for a particular employee.157 While there could be a
legitimate debate between employment versus innovation as the source of
154

See Anthony B. Sanders, Multiemployer Bargaining and Monopoly: Labor–Management
Collusion and a Partial Solution, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 337 (2011).
155
Cf. Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 395 (2003); Mark Campisano & Roberta Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss
Offsets, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 709 (1981).
156
See Bishop & Montgomery, supra note 119; cf. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable
Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221,
241–42 (2009).
157
In more technical terms, innovation provides Kaldor–Hicks but not Pareto efficiency. See
generally Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211
(1991).
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social policy, the analysis changes significantly when the law basically
chooses one over the other. This is the potential criticism of the DST—that
it favors employment over innovation and thus could be inefficient from a
microeconomic standpoint. There are several reasons why this would not
be the case, however, or at least why this would be less worrisome than it
may first appear.
First, innovation does not always, or even most of the time, result in
reduced payroll. Rather, innovation can be a way to increase productivity
out of existing resources, including labor. In such a case, an employer
could increase productivity with no decrease in total payroll and thus no
change in its marginal tax rate under the DST. Accordingly, in many
circumstances, the DST would simply result in an employer facing the
default statutory tax rate. Since the tax rate would remain the same, the
decision to innovate should not be affected by the DST.
Similarly, the DST, being a rate mechanism, applies only to profits.
Thus, the DST would not have any marginal effect on changes in
innovation or productivity that do not raise net profits. This could occur,
for example, if increases in productivity merely offset changes in demand
during and after a recession. In particular, the DST would have no impact
on the decision to innovate as a way to maintain profitability in any given
year because the DST applies annually. For example, if in Year 1 a firm
increased productivity and fired workers in response to a decrease in
demand, there would be no increase in net profits and thus no marginal
effect, even though the tax rate would be increased under the DST due to
the reduction in payroll. But in Year 2, if demand increases, the increased
productivity from Year 1 would lead to much higher profits with no change
in workforce in Year 2, meaning that under the DST the tax rate would not
go up on these higher profits. Thus, the only impact from the increased tax
rate in Year 1 would be inframarginal and there would be no impact at all
on profits in Year 2.
If, however, a firm increases productivity and all else is held constant,
there will be an increase in net profits. This, in turn, means the firm would
face higher tax rates on those marginal profits under the DST, potentially
discouraging some efficient innovation. There is no way to know what
effect the higher marginal tax rates will have on a particular innovation
with increased profits, however. Even with the higher marginal rates, net
after-tax profits should increase because the benefits of innovation tend to
be discontinuous; that is, a single innovation leads to a jump in cost savings
or productivity which continues going forward. Thus, employers would
only decline to pursue the innovation if the one-year tax increase under the
DST exceeded the present value of all the increased cost savings over the
life of the firm. So long as the one-year marginal tax increase did not
exceed the present value of the innovation’s cost savings, employers would
pursue the innovation notwithstanding the tax, making it efficient from an
economic standpoint.
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But this leads to the next difficulty: there could be a macroeconomic
“crowding out” effect—increasing total taxes in the economy could result
in less capital available for new investment by business.158 This raises the
question of whether the crowding out effect itself is sufficient to undermine
the benefits of the DST or whether the DST’s macroeconomic benefits
could outweigh this cost. Although this is ultimately an empirical question,
it is at least possible that the macroeconomic benefits of smoothing
employment and budgets over time could well exceed the macroeconomic
costs of reduced assets available for reinvestment. This is especially true in
situations where there is plenty of private capital that is going unused due
to the lack of growth in the economy as a whole.
Further, there is some evidence indicating that so long as real wages
adjust to clear the labor market over time, employment and productivity
gains will settle toward the natural rate of employment, meaning any
crowding out effect would only be temporary.159 To the extent growth is
stagnant, temporary stimulus could well offset the cost of that stimulus
through increased growth (assuming a positive multiplier).
More importantly, however, there is nothing in the DST proposal that
would prevent the enactment of other provisions intended to offset or
ameliorate any inframarginal crowding out effect. Since the DST is aimed
at the incidence of the corporate tax, it is theoretically unrelated to
innovation stimulus. Thus, a tax subsidy for innovation could potentially be
enacted in addition to the DST.
For example, accelerated depreciation, increased expensing of capital
goods, or research and development tax credits could all be adopted in
addition to the DST. The tax benefits of these investment stimulus
programs could offset or even exceed any increased taxes from the DST.
These investment stimulus programs often reduce taxable income but not
pretax profits, thereby reducing the impact of any increased tax rate under
the DST. In fact, the value of tax benefits, such as accelerated depreciation
and equipment expensing, is higher for corporations facing higher tax rates
than for those facing lower ones.160
Further, the combination of the DST and innovation stimulus, such as
a research and development tax credit, could work together to overcome
the second-best problem inherent in any tax-based incentive analysis: that
the United States taxes net income. There are several benefits to using net
income as a base for taxation, but the single biggest problem with using net
158

See ROGER W. SPENCER & WILLIAM P. YOHE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE
“CROWDING OUT” OF PRIVATE EXPENDITURES BY FISCAL POLICY ACTIONS (1970); Christina D. Romer
& David H. Romer, The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure
of Fiscal Shocks, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 763, 780–87 (2010).
159
See Olivier Blanchard & Lawrence F. Katz, What We Know and Do Not Know About the
Natural Rate of Unemployment, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 56–57 (1997).
160
See infra Part III.B.2.
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income is that it masks taxpayer-specific attributes.161 Under the DST, this
means that it is impossible to distinguish with certainty between taxpayers
who reduce employment as a means to shift the incidence of the corporate
income tax and taxpayers who reduce employment due to innovation, since
only the change in net income is observable. Thus, the DST, as with any
rate-based mechanism, must apply to both types of taxpayers, even though
the first-best solution would be to apply the DST only to the former.
The research and development tax credit can serve as a second-best
form of sorting mechanism for the above problem under two key
assumptions. First, it must be assumed that taxpayers who reduce
employment due to innovation have a lower cost of innovation than
taxpayers who reduce employment to shift the corporate income tax,
perhaps due to economies of scale, expertise, start-up costs of innovation,
or some other reason. Under this assumption, only those taxpayers actually
engaged in innovation would avail themselves of the research and
development tax credit, since it would be costly for the other taxpayers to
actually switch to innovation. Second, it must be assumed that it is costly
for a taxpayer to disguise itself as an innovator due to substantiation costs,
such as creating fraudulent receipts or work orders, or enforcement costs,
such as “red flag” audit triggers.162 Under these relatively realistic
assumptions, the DST combined with a properly designed research and
development tax credit could be structured so as to benefit taxpayers
primarily engaged in innovation. Taken together, the DST could not only
serve to offset an inefficiency in the corporate income tax and result in a
form of macroeconomic feedback, it could also make research and
development subsidies more efficient and effective.
B. Practical Challenges to Implementing the DST
Even if the DST sounds promising in theory, how could it be
implemented? Although several sticking points emerge, each has a solution
that overcomes any fatal blows to the DST’s adoption.
1. How to Calculate Employment.—The single biggest logistical
issue with implementing the DST is calculating each firm’s increase or
decrease in employment, which is required to calculate its ultimate tax rate.
At first this may seem fatal to the real world applicability of the DST, since
almost all labor data is calculated at the aggregate level.163 Upon closer
inspection, however, it need not be. In fact, there is a proxy within the
161
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Internal Revenue Code that could be utilized to approximate firm-level
employment data—the deduction for wages.164 Corporate income tax is
imposed on a corporation’s profits, calculated as gross income less
expenses, such as the cost of raw materials and the cost of wages;165 thus, as
wages go down, taxable income goes up, all else being equal.
Consequently, corporations already calculate and provide precisely the
information on their own tax returns necessary to calculate the DST. Thus,
the DST could use the percentage increase or decrease in the amount
deducted from gross income for wages on a company’s yearly tax return.
Although such an approach would solve the informational problem of
implementing the DST, it potentially creates two other problems. First, the
amount of wages paid by a corporate employer can change due to
influences other than total employment, such as inflation (and deflation as
well, although that has been less of an issue historically).166 Using nominal
wage amounts would therefore give a tax rate reduction to corporations for
increases in wages solely attributable to inflation rather than actual
increases in employment. One potential fix for this problem would be to
index the wage base for inflation,167 such that an employer would only have
an increase or decrease in their tax rate to the extent of changes in the wage
deduction from the prior year’s deduction after adjusting for inflation.
This would not be novel in the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, the tax
brackets for individuals (among other things) have been indexed for
inflation since 1981,168 with many other features being indexed for inflation
subsequently.169 Thus, since a mechanism for adjusting for inflation already
exists within the tax law, implementing such an approach within the DST
would simply require applying it to the salary deduction.170
An alternative, however, would simply be to allow for reductions in
the corporate tax rate due to increases in wages attributable to inflation.
After all, employers are not required to give cost-of-living raises to
employees—they do so typically as a matter of market competition for
labor. Although it is unrelated to the purpose of the DST per se, providing
an incentive to capital to allocate a portion of inflation-based returns to
labor could be adopted as a separate policy goal of the DST mechanism.
Regardless, the inflation issue is not one unique to the DST, and the
164
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solutions to the inflation problem should not be outside the realm of
possibility given that inflation adjustments are already part of the tax
laws.171
Another problem with using wages as a proxy for employment is that
wages can remain flat or even go up while total employment goes down,
simply by firing low-cost labor and using the savings to compensate highly
paid management. This poses a significant challenge to the effectiveness of
using wage deductions as a proxy for employment, as it could actually
incentivize regressive allocations of wealth from labor to management, the
opposite of the intended effect.172 The incentive for directors and
management to enrich themselves at the expense of labor or capital is not
unique to this proposal, however.173 For example, this issue has been the
focus of recent corporate law revisions, such as the “say on pay” rules
enacted as part of the recent Dodd–Frank law, which require shareholders
to have an opportunity to vote on executive pay.174 To the extent these rules
have any mitigating impact on management self-enrichment, which has
been debated,175 this impact would also apply for purposes of the DST.
Regardless of any corporate governance restrictions on management
self-dealing, however, the tax law could structure limits on the ability of
executives to manipulate the tax law for their own benefit. This is the other
benefit of using wage deductions as the baseline for calculating the DST
base—since the DST is also a creature of tax law, it can be made to work
within the existing mechanisms of the tax law.
For example, the Internal Revenue Code already restricts employers’
ability to deduct excessive executive salaries.176 The big exception to this
limitation is salary tied to performance, such as stock options.177 Thus, one
possibility to mitigate the problem of highly paid executives distorting the
171
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DST would be to take away the salary tied to performance exception and
deny a deduction to corporations for excessive salaries paid to executives in
the form of stock options or other equity instruments.178 Capping the
deduction for management wages in this manner would prevent
management from enriching itself at labor’s expense by denying the
corporation the ability to maintain the same total deductible wages.179
This broad proposal is not necessarily required to protect the DST,
however. Alternatives include a requirement that amounts attributable to
stock options or other equity compensation remain deductible but
separately listed on the corporation’s tax return and excluded from the
DST, or a requirement that all compensation of “highly compensated
individual[s]” (a term already defined in the Internal Revenue Code180) be
excluded from a corporation’s tax returns solely for purposes of the DST.
This would allow the DST to more directly target the broader labor market
rather than the narrow and highly compensated executive market. A similar
approach could apply to any other type of compensation not included in the
deduction for wages, such as reimbursements for employee travel,181 the
cost of office supplies, and other employee amenities, like free coffee.182
Similarly, using the income tax deduction for wages proves superior to
using other wage base numbers, such as the payroll tax wage base. In
general, for payroll tax purposes, wages are specifically defined to include
all amounts paid to employees with only a few limited exceptions,183
making it seem like the ideal proxy for the DST. One problem with this,
however, is that wages do not include other nonemployee payments, such
as payments to certain independent contractors.184 Thus, payments made to
independent contractors, such as payroll systems or customer support,
would be deductible for income tax purposes but not included in wages for
payroll tax purposes. Assuming the decision to utilize an independent
contractor is a business decision and not one intended to shift the incidence
of the corporate tax onto labor, excluding these payments under the DST
would be inappropriate since doing so would increase tax rates on pure
business decisions. Accordingly, the income tax deduction for salary and
salary-type payments would be a more appropriate baseline for the DST
than the payroll tax wage base.
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Another concern with the DST is that using total salary deduction data
would not ameliorate the incentive to shift jobs overseas, since salaries paid
to offshore employees are deductible. This is not a problem unique to the
DST proposal, however. For example, recent proposals have been made to
defer a deduction for wages attributable to the activities of foreign business
unless and until the income from such business is repatriated to the United
States.185 Assuming these proposals were to become law, the incentive to
employ workers offshore solely to minimize the DST would be reduced,
although not completely offset. In other words, if deductions attributable to
employing workers outside the United States are undesirable, they would
be so regardless of whether the DST were in place.186
Lastly, by building the DST adjustment into the tax code itself, it
becomes easier to monitor and punish inflated or fraudulent employment
numbers intended to game the DST. For instance, theoretically, the IRS
could easily raise a red flag over a tax return where profits declined sharply
but the deduction for wages remained unchanged.187 This increased chance
of detection would make it riskier for corporations to artificially inflate
wage deductions solely for purposes of manipulating the DST.188 Further,
corporations already have an incentive to inflate the wage deduction under
current law since every dollar of the wage deduction benefits the
corporation approximately thirty-five cents (the tax savings from one less
dollar of taxable profit). Moreover, whatever limits are in place currently to
prevent artificial inflation of the wage deduction on tax returns could
remain in place under the DST as well, further limiting corporations’
ability to artificially inflate wages solely to game the system.
2. Loss Corporations or Corporations Without Income.—On its face,
one weakness of the DST could be that precisely when it is needed the
most, it may matter the least. In particular, the deeper a recession becomes,
the more important unemployment becomes as a national policy matter. At
the same time, corporate taxpayers are earning less and less profit. At some
point, corporations will start losing money, at least on an annual basis.
Since the DST is a rate mechanism, a corporation with no taxable income
185

See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, PART THREE:
PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME AND INVESTMENT 13–24 (2009).
186
It is interesting to note that it is not entirely clear whether such deductions are good or bad for
the U.S. economy, with at least one study claiming there is a substantial positive domestic spillover
potential. See Mihir A. Desai et al., Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of US Multinationals,
1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 181 (2009).
187
See Raskolnikov, supra note 162, at 589.
188
This also dovetails nicely with one of the intellectual predecessors of the DST, the selfadjusting tax penalty. See id. at 599–605. The self-adjusting penalty described in Raskolnikov’s article
would apply a higher penalty on tax fraud accomplished through recurring items such as the wage
deduction rather than extraordinary items, which are easier to detect. In this way, the self-adjusting
penalty and the DST would complement each other.

1074

108:1029 (2014)

A Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-adjusting Corporate Tax Rate

would be indifferent to the rate, and thus at first glance, the DST would be
useless as a tool with respect to such a corporation.
This problem, however, may not actually be so bad. First, tax liability
is calculated on a year-by-year basis.189 What this means is that, except in
dramatic crashes where profits go negative in less than one taxable year,
the DST would still act as a marginal disincentive to layoffs as the profits
of corporations begin to decline in the face of a recession. Accordingly, the
DST could theoretically slow layoffs during the front years of a recession,
at least as a method of shifting the incidence of the corporate income tax.
Second, the DST would provide an incentive for corporations to rehire as
the economy began to recover and corporate profits began to rise.
Therefore, even if the DST did not serve its function as a deterrent to
layoffs in the face of a recession, it could serve to subsidize hiring as the
economy picks back up.
Further, facing a higher tax rate under the DST could actually prove
beneficial to loss companies (companies with tax losses), the opposite of
the intuition behind tax rates. This is due to the “upside-down” nature of
tax deductions—the higher the tax rate, the more tax deductions are
worth.190 In a simplified example, providing one dollar of deduction to a
taxpayer facing a 35% tax rate would save the taxpayer thirty-five cents,
while the same dollar of deduction would be worth fifty-five cents to a
taxpayer facing a 55% rate. For a company with tax losses, therefore, the
higher the rate imposed, the more valuable those losses become.
Perhaps just as important as the cash tax effect for loss companies are
the financial statement benefits of a higher nominal statutory tax rate in the
form of more valuable tax deductions. Assuming the DST applies only to
publicly traded corporations, those corporations would be required to file
financial statements, such as balance sheets, with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.191 In particular, one of the items required to be
reported on the balance sheet under Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) is an amount set aside to be paid for projected future tax
liabilities.192 Very broadly speaking, accountants calculate this “tax reserve”
by calculating taxable income and multiplying it by the statutory tax rate.193
Thus, any raises to the statutory tax rate could increase the amount of tax
liabilities reflected on a corporation’s balance sheet, impacting the
189
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corporation’s total reported profits, even if the corporation had no taxable
income in that particular year.194 Assuming shareholders and executives of
corporations put at least some weight on reported earnings,195 this impact
on earnings would provide corporations with a significant disincentive to
face a higher statutory tax rate, even if the corporation owes no cash taxes
in a particular year. Conversely, the value of tax losses on financial
statements increases as the tax rate increases, meaning a loss corporation
would welcome higher marginal tax rates because they would bolster the
corporation’s assets on the balance sheet.196 Thus, loss corporations could
actually benefit from any increased rates of the DST during periods of deep
recessions.
3. Do Rates Even Matter?—Another question that might arise with
respect to a rate-based proposal, such as the DST, especially for large
multinational corporations, would be whether rates even matter.
Corporations have numerous ways to strip profits out of the tax base and
thus avoid tax altogether. For example, recent reports claim that General
Electric has paid virtually no U.S. taxes in recent years197 and Google has
only paid 2.4% in taxes,198 notwithstanding the nominal 35% corporate tax
rate. At first glance, these examples seem to suggest that the statutory rate
is meaningless. If so, what good is a proposal that focuses on corporate tax
rates?
The most simplistic answer would be that, holding everything else
constant, rates matter. Even assuming the existence of deferral and incomeshifting techniques that allow companies to minimize their taxes, an
increased rate matters for the portion of income that remains subject to the
income tax. Further, although not entirely clear, there is emerging empirical
evidence that increased marginal tax rates can actually lead to increased
effective tax rates, even with all of the income stripping and tax haven
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maneuvers available to modern multinational corporations.199 Lastly, there
is evidence that marginal rates matter to corporations when determining
which countries to invest in, even if they do not translate directly into total
effective tax rates.200
In addition, the key feature of the DST is that marginal tax rates can
either go up or down. To the extent the DST would result in a reduction in
marginal rates, such a result should create an incentive to reduce the
shifting of income or other tax minimization or evasion strategies. Thus,
the DST could potentially replace the incentive to engage in tax avoidance
or evasion (through structural tax planning or otherwise) with the incentive
to reduce marginal tax rates through increased hiring, in effect a double
benefit for the United States.201
IV. THE DST AND THE RHETORIC OF TAX POLICY
Heated rhetoric over tax policy is nothing new.202 In fact, much has
been written about how proponents of certain fiscal policy proposals have
utilized rhetoric to achieve their goals.203 These include labeling the estate
tax the “death tax” and labeling other taxes as “job killers,” among
others.204 The rise of such rhetoric has generally been attributed to the
Reagan tax cuts of 1981, although the critiques of such rhetoric have cut
across administrations and party affiliation.205
Two responses have generally been adopted to challenge the use of
rhetorical devices in fiscal policy. First, the rhetoric has been challenged
with empirical facts. Thus, one challenge to the rhetoric that all taxes kill
jobs has been to look at the effect of the 1993 Clinton tax increases and
point out that the tax increases led to economic growth both in terms of
GDP and employment.206 Second, the rhetoric has been challenged as
199
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disingenuous. Challenges to the use of the label “death tax” have been
made by pointing out that “death tax” implies everyone must pay a tax on
death when, in reality, the estate tax applies to a miniscule percentage of
the population and only on the transfer of wealth to heirs, not on death
itself.207
Both of these challenges to tax policy rhetoric have existed for
decades. Yet, for the most part, the rhetoric has not changed since the
debates over the Reagan tax cuts; if anything, it seems to have gotten
worse.208 Those advocating for increased progressivity in the tax law are no
longer merely accused of hurting the economy,209 but of being socialist,210
waging war against success,211 or worse. Those advocating for tax
incentives to invest in factors of production are accused of giving away tax
cuts to millionaires212 and acting indifferently or even hostile to the working
and middle classes.213
The DST takes a different approach to challenging the overheated
rhetoric of the modern fiscal policy debate: affirmatively reclaiming the
term “tax cut” to prevent it from being used as a rhetorical tool. By
focusing on both short-term employment and long-term budget balance, the
DST undermines the polar critiques of tax proposals that only focus on one
or the other. Similarly, by looking at both demand-side stimulus, in the
form of shifting tax burdens away from labor during periods of high
unemployment, and supply-side stimulus, in the form of lower tax rates for
new investments, the DST undermines the narrative that pro-employment
policies are inherently anti-business, and vice versa.
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Perhaps more importantly, the dynamic and self-adjusting nature of
the DST could itself serve to undermine the political strength of the “tax
hike” and “tax cut” rhetoric by reducing its salience. In other words, by
being automatic it is possible for people to adjust their expectations to it, at
least as compared to ad hoc measures. Rather than be accused of a tax hike
or claim credit for a tax cut, the automatic nature of the DST makes it more
like a “new normal”—just part of the legal landscape. No politician would
have to risk proposing a tax hike or pander to offer a tax cut.
This is not a new idea; other tax proposals have adopted a permanent
and self-adjusting feature for precisely this reason.214 The difference is that
the DST would be intended not only to exploit its automatic nature, but
also to actually undermine the usefulness of the “tax cut” rhetoric as a
political tool during periods of recession, opening space for a more
reasoned and reasonable fiscal policy debate to occur. The need for a more
sober debate in the area of fiscal policy has become increasingly pressing
as a policy matter, especially as it becomes clear that even when
policymakers agree on substance, the politics of the moment and the
rhetoric of the debate may prevent any useful U.S. fiscal policy from being
implemented.215
Even worse, the rhetorical power of the “tax cut” label has been
pointed to as a leading cause for people unintentionally supporting policies
contrary to their own preferences.216 In fact, some claim that certain
policymakers intentionally utilized the policy rationale underlying “tax
cuts” to further a separate and unrelated agenda, which on its own might
not fare as well.217 Using the promise of “tax cuts” for the general
population as a “Trojan horse”218 to deliver tax benefits to small subgroups
214
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218
Id. (“David Stockman famously admitted that Reagan’s middle-class tax cuts were a ‘Trojan
horse’ that allowed him to smuggle in what he really wanted, a cut in the top marginal rate. The Bush
administration similarly follows a Trojan horse strategy, but an even cleverer one.”).
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is precisely the type of tactic that has prevented any meaningful progress in
fiscal policy. To the extent the DST undermines the theoretical foundation
of the argument by providing a policy tool that can be both a tax cut and
tax increase at the same time, depending on one’s perspective, such tactics
would no longer be possible.
By reclaiming the label “tax cut” and replacing it with an actual policy
proposal that incorporates both supply-side and demand-side policies,
proposals like the DST could defuse some of the political and rhetorical
power of the term. By attacking the foundation of the debate, rather than
attempting to disprove the rhetoric with empirical data or theoretical
critiques, proposals like the DST could destabilize the political power of
the term. Ideally, removing this rhetorical hammer could open up space for
policymakers to engage in substantive debates on fiscal policy, permitting
new ideas targeted to the unique circumstances of the modern economy to
rise to the surface.
CONCLUSION
The country finds itself in a dramatically different world than the one
it faced during the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, or even
those of 1932, 1961, or 1980. Technological and financial innovations are
obvious; it is difficult to believe that anyone could have envisioned
computers, let alone the Internet or smartphones, during those times. But
macroeconomic trends have changed as much, if not more. The national
debt as a percentage of GDP is approaching all-time highs, and the
traditional monetary and fiscal policy tools used to combat unemployment
and encourage economic growth appear to have been exhausted. But rather
than fall prey to the analytical trap of rehashing the fiscal policy debates of
these vastly different economic times, policymakers need to embrace novel
solutions for the novel problems facing the modern economy.
More specifically, the impact of macroeconomic conditions, such as
high unemployment, on the incidence of the corporate tax should be taken
into account in structuring a corporate tax robust enough to survive the next
one hundred years. The DST provides one such approach: a targeted policy
of tying the tax rate faced by public corporations to their employment
decisions. The DST achieves this by increasing a corporation’s marginal
income tax rate when it decreases payroll, while decreasing the
corporation’s marginal income tax rate when it increases payroll. This
mechanism takes into account the economic reality that employers can
more easily shift the incidence of the corporate tax onto labor during
periods of deep unemployment. The DST offsets this by imposing higher
marginal tax rates on employers that shift the incidence of the corporate tax
onto labor, while at the same time, rewarding employers through lower
marginal tax rates for new investment in labor. In this manner, the DST can
directly help subsidize employment, while also providing tax relief for
1080
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capital, thereby proving both pro-growth and pro-employment, all while
being partly if not completely self-financing.
As part of a larger project, however, the DST can hopefully provide a
model for how fiscal policy can be used to respond to the modern
challenges of the economy. If true, the DST, even if not adopted, could
help lead to solutions uniquely tailored to the problems facing the modern
economy—moving forward rather than continuing to refight the
unproductive tax policy battles of older, much different, times. Through
proposals such as the DST, real progress can be made toward solving the
pressing fiscal and economic problems facing the country, and a new,
modern corporate income tax can be built to survive the next one hundred
years.
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